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BEYOND A ZERO-SUM FEDERAL TRUST 
RESPONSIBILITY:  
LESSONS FROM FEDERAL INDIAN 
ENERGY POLICY 
 
Monte Mills* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The federal government’s trust relationship with federally-
recognized Indian tribes is a product of the last two centuries of 
Federal Indian Law and federal-tribal relations. For approximately 
the last 50 years, the federal government has sought to promote 
tribal self-determination as a means to carry out its trust 
responsibilities to Indian tribes; but the shadows of prior federal 
policies, based largely on notions of tribal incompetence and federal 
paternalism, remain. Perhaps no other policy arena better 
demonstrates the history, evolution, and promise for reform of the 
federal trust relationship than Federal Indian energy policy, or the 
range of federal statutes and regulations devoted to the management 
of the development of tribal energy resources. This article provides 
a detailed review of Federal Indian energy policy and proposes a 
new path for reform that would allow for broader tribal authority 
and, potentially, a new conception of the federal trust responsibility. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between Indian tribes, the federal 
government, and the development, transportation, and use of energy 
resources is fraught with conflict, opportunity, and challenge. While 
the world has recently learned of these conflicts through tribal 
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opposition to massive oil pipeline projects permitted to cross 
historical tribal treaty lands, such as the Dakota Access and 
Keystone XL,1 the economic potential of energy development 
within Indian Country has long been the subject of significant tribal 
and federal attention. A century and a quarter after the first federal 
law authorizing the leasing and development of tribal energy 
resources,2 there is now a comprehensive body of federal laws, 
regulations, and policies that apply to the development of both 
“traditional” and renewable energy resources within Indian 
Country.3 Taken together, these laws, regulations, and policies form 
a broad Federal Indian energy policy that is bound up in the history 
of federal oversight of tribal resources and, more recently, attempts 
to promote tribal self-determination and economic development.4 
Federal Indian energy policy reflects the balance of tribal 
sovereignty and the federal role in overseeing tribal resources at the 
heart of Federal Indian law.5 For example, since the enactment of 
the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA),6 the federal 
government has promoted natural resource development as a way to 
serve the twin aims of enhancing tribal sovereignty and economic 
prosperity—two objectives that were hallmarks of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) passed just a few years earlier.7 Nearly 
50 years later, in the early years of the current era of tribal self-
                                                
1 See, e.g., Jack Healy, Tension on the Plains as Tribes Move to Block a 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at A9 https://www.nytimes. 
com/2016/08/24/us/occupying-the-prairie-tensions-rise-as-tribes-move-to-block-
a-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/UYD3-K8LP] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) 
(includes a photo depicting “Lakota riders” demonstrating against the Dakota 
Access Pipeline).  
2 Act of February 28, 1891, Ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794, 51st Cong. (1891). 
3 See, e.g., Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2012); Indian 
Mineral Development Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012); Indian Tribal 
Energy Development & Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3506 (2012); Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012). 
4 See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Cnty.: The Evolution of 
Tribal Control over Mineral Res., 29 TULSA L.J. 541 (1994). Article provides a 
comprehensive review of the evolution of tribal authority over mineral 
development under Federal Indian energy policy. 
5 Professor Royster has aptly described the evolution of the federal-tribal 
relationship under various mineral development statutes as a “microcosm of the 
history of federal-tribal relations during the last century.” Id. at 543. 
6 Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, Ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2012)). 
7 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 416 et seq. (2012) (editorially reclassified as 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101–5144)). 
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determination, a coalition of energy-focused tribes pushed for the 
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA),8 which authorized more 
tribal independence in the negotiation and development of energy 
deals. More recent enactments and corresponding regulations have 
authorized even greater tribal authority over the leasing of surface 
lands for the development of solar and wind energy projects.9 And 
yet, notwithstanding these efforts to encourage greater tribal 
authority, tribes seeking to capitalize from energy development still 
face delays and obstacles resulting from the federal government’s 
involvement.10 As a result, “energy tribes” continue to advocate for 
even further loosening, if not eliminating, the federal role in tribal 
energy development.11 These efforts align with and may find 
support from recent policies of President Donald J. Trump and 
Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, to promote domestic energy 
production and remove the federal government from development 
decisions.12 
 Meanwhile, other tribes and tribal citizens remain concerned 
about the inability or unwillingness of federal or tribal governments 
to prevent energy development-related environmental harm to their 
tribal homelands and resources.13 The gathering of thousands of 
                                                
8 Indian Mineral Development Act, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982) 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012)). 
9 Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012); Leases & Permits, 25 C.F.R. Pt. 162 (2012). 
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-502, Report to the Chairman, 
Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate: Indian Energy Dev.: Poor Mgmt. by 
BIA has Hindered Energy Dev.on Indian Lands (June 2015), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670701.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K2C-9KNS] 
[hereinafter GAO-15-502]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-43, 
Indian Energy Dev.: Additional Actions by Fed. Agencies are Needed to 
Overcome Factors Hindering Dev. (Nov. 2016), https://www.gao. 
gov/assets/690/680935.pdf [https://perma.cc/K78A-H4L7] [hereinafter GAO-
17-43]. 
11 See, e.g., GAO-15-502, supra note 10, at 25–26; Indian Tribal Energy 
Development & Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2014: Hearing on S. 
2132 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014). 
12 See Promoting Energy Independence & Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 
13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (March 28, 2017); Mark Wolf, Interior Sec’y 
Pledges Advocacy for Tribes, THE NCSL BLOG, May 2, 2017, http://www.ncsl. 
org/blog/2017/05/02/interior-secretary-pledges-advocacy-for-tribes.aspx [https: 
//perma.cc/JKB9-C2W8]; Oversight hearing on ‘Identifying Indian Affairs 
Priorities for the Trump Admin.,” SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, March 8, 
2017, https://www.indian.senate.gov/hearing/oversight-hearing-identifying-
indian-affairs-priorities-trump-administration1 [https://perma.cc/2878-NNA2].  
13 See, e.g.,; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Pawnee Nation & Walter Echo-Hawk Sue 
over Fracking, TURTLETALK, Nov. 21, 2016, 
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2016/11/21/pawnee-nation-walter-echo-hawk-
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tribal and non-tribal citizens in opposition to the Dakota Access 
Pipeline in North Dakota powerfully demonstrated the coalescence 
of broader concerns over climate change, environmental damage, 
and these tribal issues.14 Though the core of those challenges was 
rooted in the connection of the Sioux nation to the land and water, 
the water protectors also stood in opposition to development of 
fossil fuels and energy projects more broadly.15 Those concerns 
reflected a deeper division within Indian Country, aptly summed up 
by Professor Matthew Fletcher’s recent comments that, because 
“most Indian tribes are not energy tribes, and most Indian people are 
not supportive of natural resources extraction,” the continued push 
to allow greater tribal authority over energy development may result 
in “a terrible battle over competing claims to tribal sovereignty—
tribal energy against tribal environments.”16 Thus, while historically 
focused on promoting the development of tribal energy resources, 
Federal Indian energy policy now affects a diverse array of tribal 
interests, and even when an energy tribe may benefit from a shift in 
that policy toward that tribe’s priorities, such reform may impact 
other tribes.17  
                                                
sue-over-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/MW9S-THS7]; Sulome Anderson, What 
Oil Pipelines can do to Native Am. Land & Life, VICE MEDIA, Nov. 28, 2016, 
7:30am, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/standing-rock-fort-berthold-how-
oil-can-transform-and-damage-native-reservations [https://perma.cc/WBV9-
ANWB]. 
14 See, e.g., Jason Patinkin, Standing Rock Tribe Protests over N. Dakota 
Pipeline, AL JAZEERA MEDIA NETWORK, Oct. 29, 2016, 12:18 GMT, http: 
//www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/10/north-dakota-native-
americans-protest-pipeline-161028150518748.html [https://perma.cc/V6SD-
J4YY]; Eugene Tapahe, Injustice at Standing Rock, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 
22, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/injustice-at-standing-
rock_us_58337cf6e4b0d28e5521542c [https://perma.cc/2FDX-SQBM]; Stand 
with Standing Rock: News, STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, http: 
//standwithstandingrock.net/category/news/ [https://perma.cc/Y6YM-EKR3] 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
15 See, e.g., Kyle Powys White, Why the Native Am. pipeline resistance in N. 
Dakota is about Climate Justice, THE CONVERSATION, Sept. 16, 2016, 12:28 PM 
EDT, https://theconversation.com/why-the-native-american-pipeline-resistance-
in-north-dakota-is-about-climate-justice-64714 [https://perma. 
cc/4N48-KZ8H].  
16 Matthew Fletcher, New Divisions in Indian Cnty. over Energy Justice, 
TURTLETALK, May 2, 2017, 11:35 EDT, https://turtletalk.wordpress. 
com/2017/05/02/fletcher-new-divisions-in-indian-country-over-energy-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/D537-5RQF]. 
17 One example is the conflicting interests of the Crow Nation, who seeks to 
produce coal to ship to Asian markets through territory in which other tribes of 
the Northwest have reserved treaty rights. See, e.g., William Yardley, U.S. 
Rejects Proposed Coal Export Facility, Siding with One Indian Tribe Over 
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 If the prospect of an impending conflict between tribal 
energy development and tribal environmental concerns is realistic, 
then the federal government’s role in Federal Indian energy policy 
cannot continue to ignore the environmental, social, natural, and 
cultural well-being of tribes and their members. Integrating multiple 
and sometimes conflicting values into the development of energy 
policy is already a significant challenge,18 which, when it comes to 
Federal Indian energy policy, is compounded by the historical 
narrowness of that policy.  
 Just as the various eras of Federal Indian energy policy 
reflect the eras of broader Federal Indian policy, the federal-tribal 
relationship dictated by Federal Indian energy policy reflects the 
broader federal trust relationship with Indian tribes. While the 
federal-tribal relationship with regard to energy development has 
evolved over time, it has always moved along a single axis, with 
broad, paternalistic oversight and control by the federal government 
at one end and tribal self-determination and sovereignty at the 
other.19 Though the federal policy has shifted along this axis toward 
allowing greater tribal authority, the limits of the discussion have 
always been clear: tribes can assume greater authority but only to 
the extent that such assumption correspondingly reduces federal 
obligations. In addition, tribes are limited to exercising expanded 
authority in a manner consistent with the federal government’s 
existing standards and practices.20 In other words, for tribes, Federal 
Indian energy policy is a zero-sum proposition where the only 
                                                
Another, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2016, 8:01 PM) http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-sej-cherry-point-20160509-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/8MZ5-KFKM]. 
18 See, e.g., Victor Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without the Other: The 
Challenge of Integrating U.S. Env’t, Energy, Climate, & Econ. Policy, 44 
ENVT’L. L. 1079, 1081 (2014) (“Our energy laws and policies focus on national 
security, cheap energy, or energy that causes less environmental harm, but these 
interests may work at cross purposes.”). 
19 Professor Ezra Rosser describes a similar “trade-off,” between the trust 
responsibility and tribal self-determination. Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between 
Self-Determination & the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Gov’t & the Possibility of 
Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 350–51 (2005). See also Carla F. Fredericks, 
Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2015). 
20 See, e.g., Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership 
Act (HEARTH Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 415(h)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012); Indian Tribal 
Energy Development & Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3506, 3504(e)(2)(C) (2012); 25 C.F.R. 224.63(c) (2014). 
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variables considered are whether and to what extent the tribe decides 
to assume the pre-existing federal role.21  
 The evolution of the federal trust responsibility, particularly 
in the current era of tribal self-determination, has exposed these 
limits in clear relief. Professor Kevin Washburn, who served as 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs at the United States 
Department of Interior (the Department)—the federal official most 
responsible for carrying out the trust responsibility—from 2012-
2015, recently explained that increased tribal self-determination 
means that “tribal decisions have begun to have more significant 
consequences, and have produced confusion about federal and tribal 
roles and responsibilities.”22 In addition, Professor Washburn notes 
that “the residue of federal paternalism continues to pose significant 
obstacles for tribes,”23 while, in the name of promoting tribal self-
government, both the judicial24 and legislative25 branches have 
significantly narrowed the federal government’s potential liability 
for breaches of its trust oversight and approval duties.26 In light of 
this conflict, Professor Washburn poses the “significant question 
[of] whether the trust responsibility has any value to tribes if tribes 
are subject to federal control for which the federal government is not 
legally accountable.”27 Professor Washburn ultimately concludes 
that the political branches have become largely responsible for 
fulfilling the trust responsibility,28 which now, “in effect, constitutes 
the obligation to foster and protect tribal self-governance.”29  
                                                
21 Cf. Raymond Cross, The Fed. Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-
Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 394 
(describing the United States Supreme Court’s zero sum approach toward the 
federal trust responsibility and tribal sovereignty in United States v. Navajo 
Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003)); Rosser, supra note 19, at 311–20. See also 
GOKTUG MORCOL, A COMPLEXITY THEORY FOR PUBLIC POLICY 50–55 (2012).  
22 Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of 
Fed. Indian Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 202 (2017). 
23 Id. at 223. 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 301–02 (2009); 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 173–79 (2011). 
25 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (excusing the United States from any liability or 
losses suffered by an Indian tribe pursuant to an IMDA approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the terms of that Act and applicable 
law). 
26 See Washburn, supra note 22, at 208–12 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
Indian trust jurisprudence and concluding that it “seems that the trust 
responsibility exists, but only in situations in which tribal self-determination 
does not . . . Power, it is sometimes said, is a zero-sum game.”). 
27 Washburn, supra note 22, at 212. 
28 Washburn, supra note 22, at 200. 
29 Washburn, supra note 22, at 214. 
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 Like Professor Washburn, Kevin Gover, another former 
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, analyzed the federal-tribal 
relationship after his 2001 departure from the Department of 
Interior.30 In an article published five years later, Gover called for 
bringing the trust relationship into the 21st century by criticizing 
federal policy at the time as “stirringly dumb”31 and arguing that, 
because “[t]he assumptions [of tribal incompetence and 
impermanence] underlying the trust are invalid…the specifics of the 
trust hold little value in the making of modern Indian policy.”32 
Instead, Gover proposed that “Tribes should be able to retain those 
aspects of the trust that they find useful and desirable and eliminate 
those that they do not want.”33 Citing to a pre-cursor of 2012’s 
Helping Expedite Affordable and Responsible Tribal 
Homeownership (HEARTH) Act,34 as a key step toward his 
proposal, Gover’s modern trust would allow for negotiation, on a 
tribe-by-tribe basis, of the trust duties to be carried out by the federal 
government.35 
 As two of the top-three longest serving Assistant Secretaries 
for Indian Affairs, Washburn and Gover offer deeply informed and 
critical views that, taken together, can help chart a course for the 
next era of federal Indian policy, albeit with some significant 
potential challenges.36 Perhaps more than any other policy area, 
Federal Indian energy policy provides a concrete context that 
demonstrates the shortcomings of continuing the zero-sum approach 
to balancing the federal trust responsibility with tribal self-
governance. Importantly, however, recent developments within this 
policy arena also show the potential for moving beyond that single 
axis of federal-tribal relations toward a new relationship that would 
                                                
30 See generally Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 
NAT. RES. J. 317 (2006). 
31 Id. at 373. 
32 Id. at 318. 
33 Id. at 359. 
34 Navajo Nation Trust Land Leasing Act of 2000, S. Con. Res. 161, 114 Stat. 
3211 (2000). In 2012, the HEARTH Act further amended the Indian Long-Term 
Leasing Act to allow other tribes to assume control of surface leasing, subject to 
relevant limitations. See infra Part II, Section G (Helping Expedite Affordable 
and Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act (HEARTH) of 2012). 
35 Gover supra note 30, at 359–62. 
36 For example, both Washburn recognizes the increased scrutiny of tribal 
decision-making and calls for additional federal oversight to prevent human 
rights or other perceived abuses. See Washburn supra note 22 at 224–31. Both 
Washburn and Gover note the need to protect allottees and their interests. See id. 
at 230–31; Gover supra note 30, at 367–68. 
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allow for broader and more independent tribal authority without a 
corresponding reduction of federal support or involvement. 
Therefore, while there remains a real potential for the battle of 
“tribal energy against tribal environments,”37 all tribes, whether 
energy- or environmentally-focused, stand to benefit from a 
potentially redefined federal-tribal relationship.  
 This article highlights the lessons of Federal Indian energy 
policy to demonstrate how the evolution and future of that policy 
may result in a new federal-tribal relationship; one that moves 
beyond the limits of the zero-sum approach. To do so, the article 
begins by setting the historical context of Federal Indian energy 
policy, including its basis in the federal trust relationship and its 
development through various eras of broader Federal Indian Law 
and policy. The second part details the current century’s 
contributions to Federal Indian energy policy: the 2005 Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 
(ITEDSDA),38 which authorized tribal authority over a variety of 
energy-related transactions, and the HEARTH Act,39 which, in 
combination with revised leasing regulations specifically providing 
for wind and solar projects,40 authorized greater tribal authority over 
certain energy-related surface leases. The article then proceeds to 
critique each of these approaches, as well as the most recent 
legislative and administrative reform proposals, in light of their 
continuing promotion of a zero-sum strategy. After acknowledging 
the current threats to an expanded approach to Federal Indian energy 
policy, the article proposes a new, more holistic approach to reform 
to meet the challenges left unaddressed by current law and recent 
proposals for change. The article then concludes with a few 
examples of the beginning of such an approach as well as its 
potential applicability beyond the realm of Federal Indian energy 
policy.  
 Ultimately, although recognizing that the current political 
climate poses significant threats to tribes and tribal authority, this 
article concludes on a hopeful note. The potential for meaningful 
                                                
37 Fletcher, supra note 16. 
38 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 764 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3501–06 (2012)). 
39 Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of 
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
415(h)(2012)). 
40 See generally 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.501–599 (2014). 
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reform of the federal-tribal relationship, led by tribal initiative and 
implemented in accordance with tribal priorities, is real; and, just as 
the long arc of history bends toward justice,41 the arc of the federal-
tribal trust relationship bends toward such tribally-driven reform. 
 
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP  
AND FEDERAL INDIAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
The federal trust relationship with Indian tribes is a complex, 
broad, and multi-faceted beast; however, energy and mineral 
development in Indian Country presents perhaps the clearest 
window into the evolution of that relationship. Indeed, the federal 
approach to such development has consistently reflected the 
prevailing federal policy toward Indian tribes, for better or worse, 
and, more recently, provided a vehicle for the Supreme Court to 
significantly limit the potential for tribes to enforce the trust 
responsibility by pursuing damages claims against the federal 
government.42 As such, this section provides a detailed overview of 
the history of the nature of the trust responsibility and its role in 
Federal Indian energy policy. 
 
A. The Trust Relationship 
 
The roots of the federal government’s trust responsibility to 
Indian tribes are entwined with those of the United States itself. 
Although it was not until 1831 that Chief Justice John Marshall 
described the relationship of the federal government to an Indian 
nation as “that of a ward to his guardian,” he rested that assertion 
upon earlier treaties and other relations with the tribes that, in 
Marshall’s view, informed the drafters of the Constitution to include 
                                                
41 THEODORE PARKER, TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 84–85 (Frances Power Cobbe 
ed., 1853); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Conclusion of the Selma 
to Montgomery March, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (March 25, 1965), http: 
//kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_address_at_t
he_conclusion_of_selma_march.1.html [https://perma.cc/82GA-FQ6X]. 
42 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 513 (2003) (Navajo I) (“[T]he 
Tribe’s assertions are not grounded in a specific statutory or regulatory 
provision that can fairly be interpreted as mandating money damages.”); United 
States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 301-02 (2009) (Navajo II) (“Because the 
Tribe cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation 
that the Government violated, we do not reach the question whether the trust 
duty was money mandating.”); See infra notes 89–93 (providing the original 
features of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938). 
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“Indian tribes” as entities distinct from states and foreign nations 
with which Congress was authorized to regulate commerce.43 In the 
following term of the Supreme Court, Marshall further defined the 
federal-tribal relationship to the exclusion of the state authority and 
again relied upon treaties between the tribes and the United States 
for support of his finding that “[t]he whole intercourse between the 
United States and the [Indian] nation[s], is, by our constitution and 
laws, vested in the government of the United States.”44 In addition, 
Marshall drew upon the colonial history of the United States and 
recognized that, by entering treaties with the original inhabitants of 
the nation, the United States, as had colonial powers before it, 
acknowledged the tribes’ right of self-governance and assumed the 
burdens of “furnish[ing] supplies of which they were in absolute 
need, and restrain[ing] dangerous intruders from entering their 
country.”45 Beyond the treaties, Marshall noted this recognition was 
also reflected in the earliest laws of both the Continental and United 
States Congresses.46 Thus, as conceived by Marshall, the trust 
relationship flowed from the United States’ colonial ancestry and its 
subsequent assumption of the role of protector of the tribes in the 
nation’s earliest treaties and laws.47 
The manner in which Congress first sought to regulate trade 
and intercourse between Indians and non-Indian settlers remains 
relevant for present-day Federal Indian energy policy. The first so-
called Trade and Intercourse Act, enacted in 1790, required that any 
sale of Indian property be done only pursuant to the authority of the 
United States.48 Congress also created a substantial role for the 
federal government in the regulation and licensing of those trading 
with Indians.49 These oversight and approval activities were 
consistent with duties that the United States had assumed under 
                                                
43 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831); U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 
8, cl. 3. 
44 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832). 
45 Id. at 547; see id. at 561. 
46 Id. at 549, 556–57; 2 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 175, 183 (1775); Act of Aug. 7, 
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 49. See also Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 
DUKE L. J. 999, 1007–08 (2014). Four of the nation’s first thirteen statutes dealt 
with Indian affairs. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FED. INDIAN LAW § 1.03 (Nell 
Jessup Newton, ed. 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
47 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557–58.  
48 Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. (confirmed by Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 534, 568–69 (1823)). This provision remains in effect, with 
some revisions. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
49 Act of July 22, 1790, §§ 1–3. 
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earlier treaties with various tribes and were the practical exercise of 
Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate commerce with Indian 
tribes.50 Chief Justice Marshall later conceptualized (and sought to 
justify) the United States’ interest in Indian lands as “absolute 
ultimate title … acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian 
title of occupancy.”51 This conception, in combination with Chief 
Justice Marshall’s subsequent “ward to guardian” notion, ultimately 
led to the Congressional recognition that the federal government 
holds Indian lands in trust for the benefit of tribes and, in the case of 
allotted lands, for individual Indians.52 
The federal trust responsibility and the concomitant federal 
trusteeship of a tribal property is thus a fundamental tenet of both 
federal Indian law and our nation’s constitutional structure. It is no 
surprise, then, that the United States’ approach to the development 
of tribal energy and mineral resources has depended upon how both 
the legislative and executive branches sought to carry out these 
responsibilities. 
 
B. The Early Years: What Policy? 
 
The first efforts to authorize the leasing of Indian lands for 
mining purposes arose in the early years of the allotment era. 
Congress opened that era and the subsequent rush on Indian lands 
by authorizing the allotment of Indian reservations pursuant to the 
Dawes Act of 1887.53 Contemporaneously with the push to open 
Indian reservations for allotment, other private interests sought to 
lease Indian lands for grazing and mining; however, questions soon 
arose as to whether Indians could lease their lands without federal 
approval.54 The Attorney General and the Department of the Interior 
                                                
50 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3. See e.g., Treaty with the Delawares, U.S.-
Delaware Nation, art. 5, 7 Stat. 13 (1788) http://digital.library.okstate. 
edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/del0003.htm [https://perma.cc/NW3X-WQ9E]; Treaty 
with the Choctaw, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, art. 8, 7 Stat. 21 (1786) http://digital. 
library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/cho0011.htm#mn8  [https://perma. 
cc/4CL6-AYN4]. 
51 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
52 See, e.g., Indian General Allotment Act, Ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012)); 25 U.S.C. §§ 5102, 5108 (2012).  
53 Id. 
54 Leasing of Indian Lands: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 
57th Cong. 115 (1st sess. 1902) (statement of George Sutherland, member of the 
House of Representatives from Utah, claiming that, “as early as 1884, people 
were agitating the question of securing leases of land in the Indian territory”). 
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repeatedly concluded that federal approval was required for such 
transactions; and because no federal law authorized such approvals, 
any such leases were void.55 Frustration over the limitations on the 
alienability of Indian land largely motivated the first legislative 
effort to allow leasing of such land, which came about via an 
amendment to the Dawes Act passed in 1891.56  
The 1891 Act authorized the leasing of individual allotments 
where the allottee “by reason of age or other disability … can not 
personally and with benefit to himself occupy or improve his 
allotment.”57 The act also authorized the leasing of lands “occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same … by authority 
of the Council speaking for such Indians.”58 The phrase “bought and 
paid for” initially caused some confusion because neither tribes nor 
allottees had paid for their lands. Nonetheless, the Department of the 
Interior concluded that the 1891 Act applied to lands reserved by a 
tribe where the tribe had ceded other lands to the federal 
government.59  
Additionally, the 1891 Act cured the prior lack of federal 
involvement by expressly requiring the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior for each lease and by authorizing the Secretary to 
prescribe the terms and conditions for allotment leases and the 
“agent in charge” of a reservation to recommend the terms and 
conditions for all other leases.60 According to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, however, the leases themselves were negotiated 
between the Indians and the companies seeking the lease, thereby 
affording tribal consent, and the federal role was limited to 
                                                
55 See id. at 115–116; Indian Leases, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 486 (1890) (finding that 
coal mining lease entered into between Choctaw Indians and a private 
corporation was invalid for lack of any federal law authorizing federal approval 
of such lease); Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 
235 (1885); Sinking Fund of Union & Cent. Pac., 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 491 (1890). 
56 Act of February 28, 1891, Ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794. 
57 Id. at § 3, 26 Stat. at 795. 
58 Id.. Although authorized by the 1891 act, leasing of allotments generally took 
place under a later 1909 act. Act of March 3, 1909, Ch. 263, 35 Stat. 783 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2012)).  
59 See, e.g., 25 Pub. Lands Dec. 408, 413 (Nov. 17, 1897) (“It is clear that the 
Indians on this reservation gave up what were to them valuable rights for the 
purpose of securing a place for permanent homes . . . that they may very justly 
be considered as . . . occupying lands which they have ‘bought and paid for.’”) 
(citing Act of Feb. 28, 1891, Ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794)). 
60 Id.  
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permitting the negotiations and approving the final product.61 This 
limited federal role, the tribal consent requirement, and the broad 
interpretation of the applicability of the 1891 Act caused 
consternation in Congress over the potential for tribes to lease their 
mineral resources without benefit to the federal government.62 
As the “mighty pulverizing engine” of allotment rolled on, 
tribes lost extensive ownership and control over their lands and 
resources.63 The Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock encouraged these efforts by throwing open reservations 
upon a Congressional whim, regardless of whether any treaty 
required tribal consent for such action and with a presumption that 
Congress’ action would be in “perfect good faith.”64 The allotment 
and subsequent opening of “surplus lands” within Indian 
reservations to settlement by non-Indians generally resulted in the 
alienation of subsurface minerals and resources as well, unless 
Congress specifically reserved the subsurface estate to the tribe or 
otherwise.65 In the early 1900s, growing concern over the loss of 
significant mineral resources to private ownership motivated the 
                                                
61 Leasing of Indian Lands, supra note 54, at 9 (statement of William A. Jones, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, (describing Interior’s role related a mining 
lease on the Uintah Reservation as “[a]ll the Department could do was to permit 
them to negotiate with the Indians for this lease; and they entered on the 
reservation and did negotiate with the Indians and came back with the lease 
complete.”) 
62 Leasing of Indian Lands, supra note 54, at 119–120. In closing a 1902 hearing 
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs regarding “Leasing on Indian 
Lands,” during which hearing the scope of the 1891 act had been discussed, 
Chairman William M. Stewart commented that the question of the tribes’ 
authority to enter mineral leases under that act was “a grave question” involving 
“the prosperity of almost the entire West. [T]hese reservations . . .  include vast 
mineral regions [and t]o delegate to the Indians the right to sell or lease those 
lands would lead to a great many investigations . . .  It was never intended that 
the Indians should lease the lands, practically sell them.” Leasing of Indian 
Lands, supra note 54, at 119. 
63 Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, Part II, TEACHING AM. 
HISTORY, Dec. 3, 1901, http://teachingamericanhistory. 
org/library/document/state-of-the-union-address-part-ii-8/ [https://perma. 
cc/N9FH-X7G5] (“The General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine to 
break up the tribal mass.”) According to a 1934 report to Congress by John 
Collier, then-Commissioner of Indian Affairs, allotment resulted in the 
diminishment of Indian landholdings from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 
48,000,000 acres in 1934 and, beyond loss of acreage, Collier estimated that 
allotment reduced the value of Indian lands by 80 percent and the value of 
allotted Indian lands by a staggering 85 percent. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: 
Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 17 
(2d Sess. 1934) (statement of John Collier, Commissioner). 
64 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,187 U.S. 553, 566, 568 (1903). 
65 United States v. Bruisedhead, 248 F.Supp. 999, 1001 (D. Mont. 1966). 
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United States to reserve coal from the patenting of homesteads on 
public lands.66 Similar sentiments eventually resulted in the splitting 
of the surface and subsurface estates for allotments and other lands 
within Indian Country that had been opened to entry.67 
In 1919, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
lease unallotted Indian lands in nine western states for the mining of 
metalliferous minerals.68 These provisions allowed the Secretary to 
open such lands for the location of mining claims and then, upon 
such location, lease the lands for a twenty-year period and include a 
preferential right to renew for subsequent ten year periods.69 Perhaps 
reflecting earlier concerns over the tribal consent requirement of the 
1891 Act, the 1919 leasing authorization did not require any tribal 
consent for such leases, although it did require that the royalties paid 
(not less than five percent of net value) be held by the United States 
for the credit of the tribe whose lands were leased.70 Congress also 
expressly disclaimed any federal interference with the rights of 
states to tax the “rights, property, or assets of any lessee.”71 Seven 
years later, Congress expanded this leasing authority to include 
“nonmetalliferous minerals, not including oil and gas.”72 
In 1924, Congress expanded the reach of the 1891 leasing 
provisions to include oil and gas leasing for most reservations 
authorized by treaty or agreement.73 The 1924 Act maintained the 
earlier act’s requirement of tribal consent and established lease 
terms of ten years “and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall 
be found in paying quantities.”74 In addition, however, Congress 
                                                
66 Coal Lands Act of 1909, Ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (codified as 30 U.S.C. § 81 
(2012)); Coal Lands Act of 1910, Ch. 318, 36 Stat. 583 (codified as 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 83–85 (2012)); Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868–
69 (1999). 
67 See MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF 
ENERGY DEV. 44 (Univ. of Kan. Press 1990) (listing instances where Congress 
reserved mineral estates to tribes when allotting their reservations) [hereinafter, 
AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS]; Act of Feb. 27, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-358, Ch. 
133, 39 Stat. 944 (authorizing entry on “surplus coal lands in Indian 
reservations”).  
68 Act of June 30, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-3, Ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 31, 31–34 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 399 (2012)). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. (although those funds remained “subject to appropriation by Congress for 
the [tribe’s] benefit”.) 
71 Id.  
72 Act of Dec. 16, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-531, Ch.12, 44 Stat. 922, 922–23. 
73 Act of May 29, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-158, Ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (the act 
excluded the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation).  
74 Id.  
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specifically authorized state taxation of revenues produced from 
such leases and directed the Secretary of the Interior to pay such 
taxes from the royalties generated by the leases.75 These provisions 
were subsequently extended to reservations created by executive 
order.76 
The allotment period, therefore, generated varied and 
conflicting statutory approaches to the development of the mineral 
and energy resources of Indian lands. The applicable statutory 
structure depended upon the type of mineral resource sought and the 
reservation where it was located. Depending on those factors, the 
process for securing a lease to develop such resources may or may 
not require tribal consent, state taxes may or may not be applicable, 
and the terms of each such lease may vary. Across the board, 
however, the various enactments generally tracked broader federal 
interests (i.e., protection of minerals for national benefit, opening 
lands to non-Indian settlement) without significant consideration of 
tribal objectives, including environmental or cultural concerns. 
Although some tribes were more actively engaged in negotiation 
and granting of their consent for leasing, at least where such consent 
was required, few had the information, expertise, or experience to 
effectively leverage such consent and assert greater influence on 
their federal trustee.77 Instead, consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
view of plenary federal power in Lone Wolf, leasing and 
development of Indian lands for energy and mineral purposes during 
the allotment era—at least on those Indian lands that were not lost 
during the era—was subject to Congressional whim and dominated 
by federal, not tribal, priorities.78 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
however, these priorities began to shift, and the result would define 
the development of Indian mineral resources for much of the rest of 
the 20th century. 
 
                                                
75 Id. See also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 751 U.S. 759, 763–64 
(1985) (discussing tax provisions of 1924 act); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 180–83 (1989). 
76 Act of March 3, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-702, Ch. 299, §1, 44 Stat. 1347. 
77 See AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS supra note 67, at 47–51. 
78 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568; See generally U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 
(1886) (“This power of Congress to organize territorial governments, and make 
laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution 
in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the 
territory and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the 
country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which 
must exist in the national government, and can be found nowhere else.”). 
  
 
51 
C. Reorganizing Federal Indian Energy Policy 
 
The allotment and assimilation policies of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries had drastic effects across Indian Country and, 
by the 1920s, those effects prompted many to reconsider the federal 
government’s approach to Indian policy. In 1928, the Meriam 
Report documented the current state of much of Indian Country and 
emphasized the negative impacts of prior federal policies on the 
health, education, wealth, and economies of the nation’s tribes.79 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s appointment of John Collier 
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs further hastened the shift away 
from allotment as Collier sought to promote tribal interests and 
reduce the role of the federal Indian Service.80 Collier recognized 
the failures of allotment from both the federal and tribal 
perspectives, noting in 1934 that allotment “stripped [the Indians] of 
their property … disorganized [them] as groups and pushed [them] 
to a lower social level as individuals” all while increasing federal 
costs and compelling his federal agency “to be a real-estate agent in 
behalf of the … allottees.”81 Collier’s push for reforming federal 
Indian policy and the broader social and political support for FDR’s 
New Deal ultimately led to the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 
which put an end to allotment and refocused federal Indian policy 
on tribal self-government and control.82  
The purpose of the IRA was to redefine the federal-tribal 
relationship by formally ending allotment, restoring unallotted and 
open “surplus” lands to tribes, allowing and encouraging the 
reacquisition of other lands by tribes, and promoting tribal self-
government and commerce through the adoption of constitutions 
and incorporation of so-called section 17 corporations.83 In 
furtherance of tribal control, Congress expressly vested those tribes 
                                                
79 See generally INSTITUTE FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN 
ADMIN. (Lewis Meriam ed., 1928). 
80 Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 15-16 (2d Sess. 1934) (statement of John Collier, 
Commissioner). 
81 Id. 
82 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 
(1934) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. (editorially reclassified as 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 5101–5144)). 
83 H.R. REP. NO. 73-2049, 6 (1934) (Conf. Rep.) (“[i]t is felt that the [final 
version of the IRA] is a definite step toward the goal of ‘a new standard of 
dealing between the Federal Government and its Indian wards.’”) (Citation 
omitted). 
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that elected to adopt a constitution pursuant to the IRA with the right 
“to prevent the sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of tribal 
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of 
the tribe.”84 Although the IRA did not address the specifics of 
leasing or expressly amend the earlier mineral and oil and gas 
leasing laws described above, it did establish a new federal-tribal 
dynamic for addressing these issues. 
This new dynamic was the result of a shift in how the federal 
government viewed both tribal sovereignty and its trust 
responsibility. In urging Congress to enact the IRA in the months 
leading up to its final adoption, President Roosevelt echoed the 
century-old words of Chief Justice Marshall, suggesting that the 
trust responsibility required federal support for tribal sovereignty.  
 
We can and should, without further delay, extend to 
the Indian the fundamental rights of political liberty 
and local self-government and the opportunities of 
education and economic assistance that they require 
in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is 
but the obligation of honor of a powerful nation 
toward a people living among us and dependent upon 
our protection.85 
 
Thus, rather than the top-down federal dominance of the 
allotment era that largely unilaterally dictated destructive and 
conflicting policies toward the ownership and development of tribal 
resources, the IRA—at least in purpose—sought a more balanced 
federal-tribal relationship and justified that re-balancing, at least in 
part, on the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes. 
                                                
84 25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (2012) (editorially reclassified as 25 U.S.C. § 5123(e)). 
The act made clear that these vested rights were in addition to all other powers 
vested in tribes by existing law and was later amended to make clear that tribes 
“shall retain inherent sovereign power to adopt governing documents under 
procedures other than those” set forth in the IRA. 25 U.S.C. § 476(h) (editorially 
reclassified as 25 U.S.C. § 5123(h)), adopted pursuant to Pub. L. 108-204, §103 
(2004). 
85 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT TO BURTON K. WHEELER, 
April 28, 1934, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 73-1080, at 3 (1934). Roosevelt went on 
to note that “the continuance of autocratic rule, by a Federal department, over … 
more than 200,000 [Indian] citizens … is incompatible with American ideals of 
liberty” and that the IRA “allows the Indian people to take an active and 
responsible part of the solution of their own problems.” Id. at 4. 
  
 
53 
Though not immediate, the reforms of the IRA led to a 
reexamination of the leasing scheme for Indian minerals and, in June 
1937, Charles West, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, sent a 
proposed bill to Congress that, if enacted, would “govern the leasing 
of Indian lands for mining purposes.”86 In transmitting the proposed 
bill, Acting Secretary West noted the various statutory bases of 
leasing of minerals and oil and gas, including the 1891 act, as 
amended in 1924, and the 1919 act, and made clear that one purpose 
of his proposed legislation was to “obtain uniformity so far as 
practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for 
mining purposes.”87 West also explained the inefficiencies of the 
process under the 1919 act and the limitations on developing coal 
on Indian lands, suggesting that the current statutory structure was 
not “adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their 
property.”88 Thus, West’s proposal sought to “bring all mineral 
leasing matters in harmony with the [IRA].”89 
As ultimately passed by Congress, the Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act (IMLA) furthered West’s intentions by providing a 
uniform process for leasing minerals from unallotted Indian lands,90 
requiring tribal consent for all such leases,91 and mandating 
competitive bidding (unless the tribe consents to private 
negotiations) and acceptance of the highest bid for oil and gas leases 
unless the Secretary of the Interior determined such acceptance was 
unwise or contrary to the tribe’s bests interests.92 Congress also 
                                                
86 LETTER FROM CHARLES WEST TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, reprinted in 
S. REP. NO. 75-985, at 1 (1937), and H. REP. NO. 75-1872, at 1 (1938). 
87 S. Rep. No. 75-985, at 1–2 (1937). 
88 Id. at 2. 
89 Id. at 3. 
90 Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, Ch. 198, 52 Stat. 
347 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2012)). Certain tribes were excluded 
from application of the original IMLA, although subsequent enactments 
extended the statute to some of their lands as well. Id. at 348, § 6 (excluding the 
Papago, Crow, and Osage Reservations as well as the ceded lands of the 
Shoshone Reservation and the coal and asphalt lands of the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Tribes); Act of May 27, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-47, Ch. 106, § 2, 69 
Stat. 67 (rescinding the exclusion of the Papago Reservation); Act of Aug. 27, 
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-780, § 1, 72 Stat. 935 (extending the IMLA to apply to 
mineral leasing on the Wind River (Shoshone) Reservation); Act of Sept. 16, 
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-283, 73 Stat. 565 (extending the IMLA to apply to leasing 
on the Crow Reservation). Allotted lands were still leased pursuant to the 1909 
act, although the leasing regulations eventually incorporated many of the same 
procedures as authorized by the IMLA. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. pt. 212 (2017). 
91 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2012). 
92 Id. § 396(b).  
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authorized the Secretary to adopt rules and regulations to guide 
implementation of the IMLA,93 and the first version of those 
regulations included the minimum rent and royalty that must be paid 
to a tribe pursuant to an IMLA lease.94 These primary features of the 
IMLA served the main purposes of West’s proposal to provide 
uniformity, encourage tribal self-government and control, and 
promote economic development and return for tribes.  
In addition, in an effort to harmonize the IMLA with the 
IRA, the IMLA did “in no manner restrict the right of tribes” that 
had chosen to organize under the IRA to lease their lands “in 
accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter 
adopted” pursuant to the IRA.95 Building on this statutory language, 
the initial IMLA regulations recognized the right of IRA tribes to 
supersede those rules through constitution, bylaw, charter, 
ordinance, resolution or other authorized action.96 This language 
remains in the IMLA regulations, although now with the proviso 
that “tribal law may not supersede the requirements of Federal 
statutes applicable to Indian mineral leases.”97 The proviso was 
added in 1996 after the first major overhaul of the IMLA leasing 
regulations since 1938 and, in publishing those revised regulations, 
the Department noted that the proviso clarified that tribes could not 
avoid Secretarial approval of each IMLA lease.98 The 1996 Final 
Rule also purported to limit tribal authority to supersede federal 
IMLA regulations and require secretarial approval for any such 
proposed supersession.99 In recent litigation, the Department has 
argued that the recognition of the authority of IRA tribes in the 
IMLA applies only to that Act’s leasing provisions, i.e., public 
auction, advertisement, and bidding, and not to “laws or regulations 
                                                
93 Id. § 396(d). 
94 25 C.F.R. § 186.13 (1938) (rental of $1.25 per acre and royalty of 12 ½ 
percent).  
95 25 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2012). 
96 25 C.F.R. § 186.29 (1938) (“The regulations in this part may be superseded by 
the provisions of any tribal constitution, bylaw or charter issued pursuant to the 
[IRA] . . . or by ordinance, resolution or other action authorized under such 
constitution, bylaw or charter. The regulations in this part, in so far as they are 
not so superseded, shall apply to leases made by organized tribes if the validity 
of the lease depends upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.”)  
97 25 C.F.R. § 211.29 (2014). 
98 Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Dev. & Leasing of Allotted Lands for 
Mineral Dev., 61 Fed. Reg. 35,634, 35,637 (July 8, 1996) (amending 25 C.F.R. 
pts. 211, 212). 
99 Id. at 35,652. 
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governing oil and gas extraction operations on tribal land.”100 Thus, 
the apparent recognition of independent tribal authority for leasing 
in 25 U.S.C. § 396b has gone largely unexercised and has been 
significantly narrowed by subsequent regulatory and interpretive 
stances.101 
Indeed, overriding federal involvement in the leasing and 
development of minerals under the IMLA largely eclipsed the law’s 
intended promotion of tribal self-government. Aside from the tribal 
consent required for leasing and to engage in the private negotiation 
of leases, the BIA mostly controlled the IMLA leasing process 
through standard leasing forms102 and unilateral authority to cancel 
a lease.103 The IMLA’s mandate that, once entered for an initial ten-
year term, leases would remain in effect so long as minerals were 
“produced in paying quantities” further compounded the effect of 
that authority.104 Although the IMLA regulations set a floor for rents 
and royalties in each lease,105 once approved, those leases remained 
in effect, often with royalty amounts that were far outstripped by the 
changing market and other conditions.106  
Although some tribes were able to negotiate decent 
concessions, many lacked sufficient information regarding their 
resources to do so. 107 As a result of the sparse information available 
and the state of many tribal governments at the time, “[d]uring the 
1950s and 1960s when many of the early mineral contracts were 
negotiated, tribes had few alternatives to relying upon BIA.”108 Even 
then, in at least one instance, the BIA’s efforts to honor tribal 
decision-making were also frustrated by the rigidity of the IMLA’s 
                                                
100 Fed. Defendants’ Merits Brief (“Declaratory Judgment Issues”), S. Ute 
Indian Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, case no. 1:15-cv1303-MSK, (D. Colo. 
filed Oct. 15, 2015). This case was stayed shortly after the filing of this merits 
brief and the parties ultimately settled the matter without the court ruling on the 
merits of the United States’ argument. See infra notes 280–284 and 
accompanying text. 
101 See Peter C. Maxfield, Tribal Control of Indian Mineral Dev., 62 ORE. L. 
REV. 49, 63–64 (1983) (describing other challenges of the supersession 
provision in the regulations). 
102 See 25 C.F.R. § 186.30 (1938). 
103 Id. at § 186.27.  
104 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2012).  
105 25 C.F.R. § 186.13 (1938). 
106 JAMES ROBERT ALLISON III, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SURVIVAL: AM. ENERGY 
DEV. & INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION 41 (2015) (average royalty for Indian 
coal was $0.158/ton while, by 1972, it was $7.66/ton on the open market). 
107 AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS supra note 67, at 56. 
108 AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS supra note 67, at 58.  
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structure.109 The federal government also failed to adequately 
calculate, collect, and pay royalties (such as they were) on many 
leases, leading to an extensive investigation and review of the entire 
federal royalty system.110 Worst of all, even when tribal efforts to 
negotiate better IMLA deals were derailed by ex parte collusion 
between the Secretary of the Interior and the other parties to the 
negotiations, the Supreme Court excused the federal government 
from any liability for damages relying, in part, upon the IMLA’s 
purported aim of promoting tribal self-determination.111 Thus, 
although the IMLA was intended to serve the IRA’s purposes of 
promoting tribal self-determination and economic development, 
nearly half a century of leasing under the act led tribes to chafe at its 
lack of flexibility and their inability to assert greater governmental 
control over the management of their own resources.112 These 
concerns became particularly acute in the late 1970s as tribal 
governments became more sophisticated and came to better 
understand both their own political and technical capacities.113 
 
D. Alternatives to Leasing under the IMLA 
 
Just as the IMLA effectuated the federal trust 
responsibility—and restraint on alienation—of Indian mineral 
resources,114 federal law also required federal involvement in and 
approval of various other types of tribal dealings. For example, in 
1955, Congress enacted what has become known as the Indian 
Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415, which authorized the 
leasing of Indian-owned surface lands for “public, religious, 
                                                
109 See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1436–37 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (Secretary’s refusal to approve a mining plan without tribal 
approval constituted a taking of the lessee’s leasehold rights where no such 
tribal approval was required by IMLA or its regulations).  
110 See DAVID F. LINOWES, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
OF THE NATION’S ENERGY RES. (January 1982); Fed. Coal Leasing: Comm. on 
Fair Market Value Policy: Hearing Before the S. Energy & Nat. Res. Comm. 
98th Cong. 12 (1984) (testimony of David F. Linowes, Chairman) [hereinafter 
LINOWES COMM. HEARING]. 
111 Navajo Nation v. United States, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003).  
112 AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 67, at 52–53; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 
supra note 46, at 1128–29. 
113 See generally AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 67, at 62–90; ALLISON 
III, supra note 106, at 98–172. 
114 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2012); See infra Part II, Section D (Alternatives to 
Leasing under the IMLA). 
  
 
57 
education, recreation, residential, or business purposes.”115 
Similarly, the federal law dating to 1872 and amended in 1958, 
provided requirements for contracting with tribes and individual 
Indians “for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of 
value … or for the granting or procuring of any privilege … in 
consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands.”116 
As amended in the late 1950s,  81 of the statute required that any 
such “services” contracts be in writing, with duplicates or copies 
delivered to each party, have a fixed term of duration, and be 
approved in writing by the Secretary of the Interior and the 
commissioner of Indian affairs, among other required details.117  
Notwithstanding the above limitations dictated by federal 
law, in the late 1970s, some tribes creatively interpreted the 
contracting process outlined in federal law to expand their ability to 
enter mineral development deals beyond the restrictive leasing-only 
regime of the IMLA.118 In 1982, the Department of the Interior 
identified six federally-approved non-lease agreements for the 
development of mineral resources, “[t]he approval authority [for 
which] was based on section 81.”119 In addition, some tribes urged 
that a broad reading of the term “lease” in the IMLA could allow for 
the approval of joint venture and other more flexible development 
arrangements.120 In fact, leasing regulations proposed by the 
Department of the Interior in 1977 and 1980 supported such 
interpretations.121 The potential for such flexibility was, however, 
                                                
115 Ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 (1955). This act also amended the 1909 mineral leasing 
act for allottees to incorporate the competitive bidding requirements of the 
IMLA. Id. §3, 69 Stat. at 540. In 2012, the HEARTH Act amended the Indian 
Long-Term Leasing Act to provide for tribal control, subject to relevant 
limitations, over the surface leasing process. See infra § 2, part G (the Helping 
Expedite Affordable and Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act (HEARTH) of 
2012). 
116 Act of May 21, 1872, Ch. 177, 17 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at Act of 
Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-770, 72 Stat. 927, and Act of March 14, 2000, 
Pub. L. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46 (codified in 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012)).. 
117 Act of May 21, 1872, Ch. 177, § 2, 17 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in Act 
of Aug. 27, 1958, Pub. Law. No. 85-770, 72 Stat. 927).  
118 See, e.g., ALLISON III supra note 106, at 151–154 (discussing the use of 
“alternative contracts”). 
119 Indian Mineral Dev.: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Select Comm. on 
Indian Affairs on S. 1894, 97th Cong. 72 (1982) (statement of Tim Vollman, 
Solicitor’s Office) [hereinafter IMDA Hearings]. 
120 Id. 
121 Mining on Indian Lands: Mineral Dev. Contracts, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083, 
18,085 (proposed March 30, 1977) (relying on the statutory authority of the 
IMLA, Section 81, the IRA, the 1909 Act, the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act 
and others to propose regulations that would have defined “contract” for mining 
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called into serious question later in 1980, however, when one such 
alternative arrangement, proposed by and between the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe and ARCO, led Clyde O. Martz, then Solicitor of 
the Department of the Interior, to conclude that the Department had 
no statutory authority to approve such agreements.122 This reversal, 
called the “final betrayal” by one prominent tribal leader, led tribes 
to refocus their push for broader flexibility from the negotiating 
table to the halls of Congress.123 
 
E. The Indian Mineral Development Act:  
     Reform on a deal-by-deal basis 
 
Tribal frustration with the limitations of the IMLA and the 
federal government’s management of leasing thereunder led many 
tribes to seek other avenues for pursuing energy development. The 
energy market of the mid- and late 1970s and the desire of the energy 
industry to find and develop domestic energy sources offered 
significant potential gains for tribes, particularly in comparison to 
their losses under the IMLA.124 This potential, in combination with 
                                                
and development purposes as expressly “not limited in its meaning to leases, 
permits, or licenses”); Id. at 18,093 (same for oil and gas “contracts”); Indian 
Mineral Dev. Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 53,164, 53,165 (proposed Aug. 11, 
1980) (pursuant to the authority to promulgate regulations under IMLA, the 
1909 Act, the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, and a 1940 act regarding leasing 
inherited allotments, proposing a regulation for prospecting and mining that 
would allow “contracts” for such activities that were “not limited . . . to leases, 
permits, or licenses”); Indian Mineral Dev. Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. at 53,174 
(same for oil and gas “contracts”). 
122 IMDA Hearings, supra note 119, at 72; AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra 
note 67, at 87. 
123 Marjane Ambler, CERT Stresses Production, not Rebellion, HIGH CNTY. 
NEWS 6 (Sept. 19, 1980),  http://s3.amazonaws.com/hcn-media/archive-
pdf/1980_09_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/76CZ-EFGC] As evidenced by their 
approval of various agreements and proposed regulations, DOI officials at the 
time clearly agreed that tribes should have such flexibility but were ultimately 
bound by the Solicitor’s view that the Department lacked statutory authority for 
enabling such flexibility. At least one official noted that the Department might 
have recognized the statutory issue earlier, i.e., prior to the publication of the 
seemingly illegal regulations, but the Department was not “getting any pressure 
from tribes to enter such contracts at that time.” Id. Thus, unlike the IMLA and 
most other pre-self-determination era Indian statutes, tribal efforts, not those of 
their federal trustee, were primarily responsible for the Indian Mineral 
Development Act. See also AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 67, at 62-
90; ALLISON III, supra note 106, at 167–72. 
124 See, e.g., AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 66, at 82–83 (describing 
the increased industry attention toward Indian Country in these years and the 
effect of changing federal rules for oil and gas prices, changing both “[t]he 
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the recent ushering in of a new era of federal policy devoted to 
promoting tribal self-determination and the growing technical and 
governance capabilities of tribes,125 changed the face of Federal 
Indian energy policy once again.  
Congress passed the Indian Mineral Development Act 
(IMDA) on December 22, 1982.126 Based on the concerns raised by 
various tribes, allottees, developers, and federal officials, Congress’ 
intent in doing so was specifically focused on “provid[ing] Indian 
tribes flexibility for the development and sale of their mineral 
resources.”127 This flexibility sought to serve the same objectives 
that the IMLA had nearly 50 years earlier, “first, to further the policy 
of self-determination and second, to maximize the financial return 
tribes can expect for their valuable mineral resources.”128 
Beyond seeking to promote goals similar to those of the 
IMLA, the IMDA also employed a structure similar to that of the 
IMLA, as both focused on the development, review, and approval 
of an individual development transaction. Where the IMLA had 
authorized only leases, however, the IMDA expanded the types of 
agreements to be employed in such transactions to include “any joint 
venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or 
other agreement,” which were collectively referred to as a “Minerals 
Agreements.”129 The IMDA also eliminated the federal role in the 
auction and award of leases and instead required that, upon the 
request of a tribe and subject to the “extent of his available 
resources,” the Secretary “shall have available advice assistance, 
and information during the negotiation of a Minerals Agreement.”130 
The IMDA provided clear guidance for the federal review and 
                                                
Indians’ game rules . . .  [and] with the rise in oil prices, . . . the stakes” of the 
game too.) 
125 Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Cong. on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. 
PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970); E.g., Indian Self-Determination & Education 
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-683, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended 
in Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 
Stat. 2285 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. (2012)) (editorially reclassified 
as 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.)). The Council of Energy Resource Tribes, or 
CERT, a coalition of energy-focused tribes engaged in lobbying and policy 
work, was also a significant factor in the development of new legislation and 
policy. See, e.g., Ambler supra note 123. 
126 Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2107 
(2012)).  
127 S. REP. NO. 97-472, at 2 (1982).  
128 Id. 
129 25 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012). 
130 Id. § 2106. 
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approval of each such agreement by requiring that the Secretary 
consider whether the agreement would be in the “best interest of the 
Indian tribe or …individual Indian … party,” including the 
“potential economic return … , the potential environmental social 
and cultural effects … , and provisions for resolving disputes.”131 
Thus, the IMDA removed the stringent lease-only shackles of the 
IMLA and opened the door for tribes to negotiate their own deals 
while retaining federal review and approval requirements generally 
consistent with the overriding federal trust responsibility. In view of 
the expansion of tribal negotiating authority, however, the IMDA 
limited the potential liability of the federal government “for losses 
sustained by a tribe or individual Indian” resulting from any 
Minerals Agreement approved by the Secretary in compliance with 
the statute.132 
The IMDA offered a much needed remedy to the tribal 
complaints about the IMLA’s narrow authority and the expanding 
use of alternative agreements to sidestep those limitations. But, 
much as the IMLA’s shortcomings ultimately demanded further 
legislative action, the IMDA has not entirely fulfilled its objectives 
of promoting tribal self-determination and maximum economic 
return. Initially, national and international energy and economic 
policies during the first Reagan administration severely undermined 
tribal economic positions and bargaining power.133 The push to 
boost domestic energy production motivated an increase in global 
production and, in the words of one commentator, “the ‘energy 
crises’ of the 1970s turned into the ‘oil glut’ of the mid-1980s.”134 
The resulting weakened position of many energy companies left 
tribes seeking deals more like the one-sided IMLA leases than the 
broader and more balanced arrangements made possible by the 
IMDA.135 By 1988, about half of the sixty-seven IMDA agreements 
entered into by tribes since the passage of the act were leased like 
those authorized by the IMLA with only slight modifications that 
could allow for escalating royalties or other benefits not available 
                                                
131 Id. § 2103(a). That section also makes clear that no separate study of these 
factors is required beyond the review of the potential effects of the proposed 
agreement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(C). Id. § 2103(b). 
132 Id. § 2103(e).  
133 See ALLISON III, supra note 106, at 174–175. 
134 See ALLISON III, supra note 106, at 175. 
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under the strict IMLA structure.136 Although the IMDA intended to 
allay some of these difficulties by providing that the Secretary 
would assist tribes in the negotiation of Mineral Agreements, the 
Department of the Interior noted that such assistance could prove 
“unwieldy and potentially very costly.”137 Congress never 
appropriated funds to support any additional assistance from 
Interior, leaving the full benefits of IMDA’s flexibility further 
unrealized.138 
In recognition of the continuing challenges faced by tribes 
seeking to develop their own energy resources, Congress, as part of 
the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992, included a 
title specifically dedicated to Indian energy resources.139 In doing 
so, Congress sought to “support … Indian tribes to develop the 
institutional capacity to participate fully in the development of 
[reservation] energy resources.”140 Just as the IMLA and IMDA 
both sought to promote economic development and tribal 
sovereignty, the purposes of the Indian energy title in the 1992 Act 
were to “allow Indian tribes to become more self-sufficient [and] 
provide[ ] Indian tribes with the technical and financial assistance to 
control the development of … natural resources.”141  
To fulfill these purposes, Congress created a demonstration 
program to help support the building of tribal “managerial and 
technical expertise” to promote tribal assumption of control over the 
development of mineral resources.142 The 1992 Act also authorized 
grants by the Secretary of the Interior to assist tribes “in the 
development, administration, implementation, and enforcement of 
tribal laws and regulations governing the development of energy 
resources on Indian reservations.”143 Lastly, the 1992 Act 
established the Indian Energy Resource Commission (the 
Commission) to study, among other related topics, the “barriers or 
obstacles to the development of energy resources on Indian 
reservations, and make recommendations designed to foster the 
development of energy resources on Indian reservations and 
                                                
136 AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 67, at 243.  
137 H.R. REP. NO. 97-746, at 13 (1982). 
138 AMBLER, BREAKING BONDS, supra note 67, at 239–40.  
139 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, Title XXVI, 106 Stat. 3113. 
140 H.R. REP. NO. 102-474, pt. 8, at 92 (1992). 
141 Id. at 93. 
142 Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 2603(a)(1), 106 Stat. 3114. 
143 Id. § 2604(a), 106 Stat. at 3114–15; H.R. REP. NO. 102-474, pt. 8, at 92. 
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promote economic development.”144 Despite its early intentions, 
Congress never funded the study and the Commission never fulfilled 
its mandate. The Commission’s statutory authorization was repealed 
by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT),145 and nothing in the 
1992 Act changed the federal statutory structures by which tribes 
could authorize the development of their mineral resources.  
At the end of the twentieth century, then, notwithstanding 
the successful efforts of many tribes to push for the IMDA and 
expand their ability to negotiate and enter broader and more flexible 
energy development deals, Congress was still seeking a better 
solution to promote tribal economic development and self-
determination in its tribal energy policy—congressional (and tribal) 
objectives that had been at the forefront since the IMLA’s passage 
in 1938. The next statutory efforts to meet these goals opened the 
door for the modern era of Federal Indian energy policy with the 
promise of a refined federal trust relationship between the United 
States and Indian tribes.  
 
F. The Indian Tribal Energy Development  
     and Self-Determination Act of 2005 
 
Though the Indian energy title of the 1992 Energy Policy Act 
planted the seeds for the reform of Federal Indian energy policy, that 
reform did not begin to take shape for nearly a decade. In 2003, two 
Indian energy bills sought to build on the technical and financial 
assistance promised in the 1992 Act, but also initiated a discussion 
of the federal trust responsibility as it related to the review and 
approval of certain energy-related transactions.146 For example, 
each of the proposals included provisions that would remove the 
requirement of federal approval for certain leases, agreements, or 
rights-of-way, provided that each such lease, agreement or right-of-
way was authorized by the tribe in accordance with tribal regulations 
                                                
144 Id. at § 2605(k)(5), 106 Stat. at 3117.  
145 Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act & the Native Am. Energy Dev. & Self-
Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 & S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 126 (2003) [hereinafter ITEDSDA Hearing] (statement of 
A. David Lester, Executive Director, Council of Energy Resource Tribes); 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 15801 et seq.).  
146 Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act, S. 424, 108th Cong. (2003); Native Am. 
Energy Dev. & Self-Determination Act, S. 522, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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approved by the Secretary.147 Although the proposals varied slightly 
in their scope and application,148 each established minimum 
standards for the tribal regulations that would govern such 
approvals, including a requirement that the tribal regulations 
provide an environmental review process similar to that required by 
the National Environmental Policy Act.149 As part of such a review, 
the tribal regulations would mandate an opportunity for “public” 
review and comment on the lease, agreement, or right-of-way and 
one of the legislative proposals would have required consultation 
with the local state.150 In addition, each proposal included provisions 
that would allow for challenges of tribal actions based on alleged 
non-compliance with Secretarially-approved tribal regulations.151 
Finally, just as with the IMDA, the proposals included waivers of 
any federal liability that might result from tribal decisions made in 
accordance with their own, secretarially-approved regulations.152 
These proposals for reform provided tribes yet another 
option for pursuing the development of their energy resources and 
corresponding economic benefits. Unlike the IMLA and the IMDA, 
however, these proposals did not focus on individual agreements, 
whether they be leases under the IMLA or Minerals Agreements 
under the IMDA. Instead, the new proposals offered each tribe the 
option to assume broader regulatory review and approval 
responsibilities for all future energy-related leases, agreements, and 
rights-of-way, provided that tribal regulations meet certain 
standards, receive federal approval, and guide tribal decisions. This 
shift in focus marked a further change in the federal trust 
responsibility as it authorized, if not promoted, federal review and 
approval of expanded tribal governmental authority, subject to 
certain limitations, rather than requiring federal review and approval 
of each individual transaction. Thus, instead of determining whether 
the terms and conditions of an IMLA lease or a proposed IMDA 
Minerals Agreement would be in the best interests of a tribe, these 
proposals instead authorized tribes to take on the responsibilities 
(and corresponding administrative costs and burdens) for reviewing 
                                                
147 S. 424, § 103; S. 522, § 2605. 
148 E.g., S. 424, for example, focused on the siting of energy transmission and 
refining facilities while S. 522 applied more broadly to leases, business 
agreements and rights-of-way involving energy development or transmission. 
149 S. 424 § 103(f)(3); S. 522, § 2605(e)(2)(C). 
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and approving their own agreements according to their own 
regulations. Thereafter, the federal government would be excused 
from any liability for those decisions. Although this new conception 
of the federal trust responsibility was met with a mixed reception 
from tribes and commentators,153 the provisions, with some 
refinement, found their way into Title V of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, which was enacted as the Indian Tribal Energy Development 
and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSDA).154  
The ITEDSDA created a new forum for the negotiation of 
energy-related agreements. Rather than focusing on federal 
oversight of deals negotiated and reached between Indian tribes and 
lessees, developers, or partners in their energy resource plans, the 
ITEDSDA established Tribal Energy Resource Agreements 
(TERAs) to be entered into by and between a tribe and the 
Secretary.155 Far more than just transaction-specific or resource-
specific terms, a TERA would instead delineate a tribe’s authority 
to enter and approve their own “lease or business agreement for the 
purpose of energy resource development on tribal land,” subject to 
certain conditions, and thereby obviate the need for federal approval 
of each such lease or agreement.156 The necessary conditions for 
approval of a TERA evolved from those first proposed in the early 
2000s and included that the tribe have an environmental review 
process requiring public notice and input;157 that the tribe’s process 
for approving a lease, business agreement, or right-of-way meet 
certain standards applicable to each such transaction;158 and that a 
                                                
153 See ITEDSDA Hearing, supra note 145, at 83 (statement of Vernon Hill, 
Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council, on behalf of the Eastern 
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tribe have “sufficient capacity to regulate the development of energy 
resources of the tribe.”159  
Thus, the ITEDSDA, building on the concepts of its earliest 
proposals, created yet another new avenue for tribes to pursue 
energy development. Unlike the IMLA and the IMDA, which 
remain options for tribes to consider, the ITEDSA authorized a shift 
of the federal government’s role in the development of tribal energy 
resources away from overseeing, reviewing, perhaps second-
guessing, and approving a tribe’s business judgment and negotiating 
skill represented in an individual transaction. Instead, the ITEDSDA 
envisioned a broader federal responsibility focused on tribal 
regulatory capacity and standards, but still retained a responsibility 
for reviewing such capacity and standards in light of the values and 
standards of the federal regulatory scheme.160 As described in 
greater detail below, the retention of these and other aspects of 
Federal Indian energy policy’s zero-sum history has overshadowed 
the promise of such a shift (at least thus far). In addition, the 
approach detailed in the next section, which is more consistent with 
this modern view of the trust responsibility, has also overtaken the 
TERA model as an avenue for reform. 
 
G. The Helping Expedite Affordable and Responsible Tribal 
Home-ownership (HEARTH) Act of 2012 
 
As described above, the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of 
1955, which provides statutory authority for the leasing of the 
surface of tribal and individual trust lands for certain purposes, has 
at times been seen as a mechanism for facilitating tribal energy 
development.161 Recently, the broader push for opportunities to 
develop solar and wind energy resources has highlighted how 
surface leasing can contribute to these industries and enhance tribal 
economic development.162 Like the evolution of the trust 
responsibility as it related to mineral development, the role of the 
                                                
159 Id. §3504(e)(2)(B)(i). 
160 Gover, supra note 30, at 346–50. ITEDSDA’s concept was consistent with 
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161 See Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Dev.: Renewables & the Problem of the 
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federal government in reviewing and approving surface leases for 
tribal lands has shifted away from its paternalistic origins and 
toward a greater recognition of and support for tribal regulatory 
authority. 
The most recent example of this shift in the surface leasing 
context is the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal 
Home Ownership Act (HEARTH Act) of 2012.163 Although the 
1955 Indian Long-Term Leasing Act had previously been amended 
to allow certain tribes to review and approve their own surface leases 
without Secretarial approval,164 the HEARTH Act amended the 
statute to authorize surface lease approval authority over tribal lands 
for any tribe choosing to pursue such authority by seeking 
Secretarial approval of the tribe’s proposed leasing regulations.165 
Just like the TERA structure authorized by the ITEDSDA, the 
HEARTH Act required that the tribal regulations meet certain 
standards, including that they are “consistent with” federal leasing 
regulations and provide for an environmental review process 
including public notice, an opportunity for comment, and responses 
to those comments.166 Also like the ITESDA, the HEARTH Act 
allows for interested parties to challenge tribal decisions and allows 
the Secretary to review whether a tribe has complied with its own 
regulations in the approval of a lease.167 Unlike the ITEDSDA, the 
HEARTH Act did not require any determination of tribal capacity 
or formal agreement—such as a TERA—between a tribe and the 
Secretary.168 Rather, tribes seeking additional authority under the 
HEARTH Act simply had to ensure “consistency” between their 
regulations and federal leasing regulations.169 
The adoption of new federal leasing regulations expanded 
the reach of the HEARTH Act into energy development. On 
December 4, 2012, the Department of the Interior published final, 
revised leasing regulations applicable to Residential, Business, and 
Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land.170 Though the 
                                                
163 Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of 
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prior regulations provided procedures for the review and approval 
of business leases under the authority of the Indian Long-Term 
Leasing Act—which could have included leases for certain energy-
related facilities—the 2012 regulations made explicit a process for 
tribes seeking to lease tribal land for the purposes of solar or wind 
energy projects.171 When combined with the HEARTH Act’s option 
for additional tribal regulatory and approval authority, these leasing 
regulations, by specifying the procedures for the leasing of tribal 
land for renewable energy purposes,172 offered another new avenue 
for tribes to pursue greater authority over energy development on 
their lands. Just as the ITEDSDA had formalized the shift of the 
federal government’s focus from individual mineral development 
deals to broader tribal authority, the HEARTH Act and the new 
federal leasing regulations offered a way for tribes to remove federal 
approval from the equation for wind and solar energy-related 
surface leases.  
Both the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act offered new 
opportunities for tribal authority in hopes of promoting the same 
purposes forwarded by the IMLA and the IMDA– the seemingly 
straightforward but apparently challenging twin aims of tribal self-
determination and economic development. Despite the promise of 
these new approaches, however, in June 2015, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report 
detailing the challenges that tribes face when seeking to develop 
their energy resources.173 Among other factors, the GAO determined 
that a complex regulatory framework, largely the product of the 
federal statutory scheme detailed supra, contributes to hindrances 
on tribal development.174 The federal role in the development of 
tribal energy resources implicates broader federal policies and 
responsibilities, such as those promoted by the National 
                                                
171 Id. at 72,441 (“The current regulations provide for the approval of these 
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),175 the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA),176 and the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA).177 As a result, some interviewed by the GAO indicated that 
they believed that “the applicability of some of these laws results in 
Indian lands being managed according to priorities generally 
associated with public lands and that review processes and 
requirements associated with the acts can hinder development.”178 
Therefore, although the HEARTH Act and the TERA’s of the 
ITEDSDA seem to offer new solutions to the challenges of 
promoting tribal authority and the corresponding reduction of the 
federal role in energy development, neither has yet lived up to its 
potential. 
 
III. STILL ZERO-SUM: ISSUES WITH TERAS AND  
THE HEARTH ACT AND CURRENT  
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
Despite the shift of federal oversight and responsibility 
promised by the ITEDSDA, as of early 2017, nearly a dozen years 
after they were authorized by the ITEDSDA, no TERA exists 
between a tribe and the federal government. A number of factors 
have been identified by tribes, scholars, and the GAO to explain why 
tribes have yet to enter a TERA.179 Most of these factors illustrate 
the ITEDSDA’s adoption of the single-axis approach of federal-
tribal energy oversight. For example, the environmental review 
process that a tribe must put in place in order to enter a TERA 
requires public (including non-tribal) review and comment on 
proposed leases, agreements, and rights-of-way to be approved by a 
tribe.180 While consistent with the general federal policy expressed 
by the NEPA, non-tribal member review and comment on tribal 
decision-making may not be consistent with tribal interests and 
                                                
175 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012)). 
176 Endangered Species Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) 
(codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)). 
177 An Act to Establish a Program for the Preservation of Additional Historic 
Properties Throughout the Nation, & for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 
Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101 et seq., formerly cited as 16 
U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.). 
178 GAO-15-502, supra note 11, at 25. 
179 See, e.g., Kronk, supra note 153. 
180 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C) (2012). 
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values. In addition, the ITEDSDA’s waiver of federal liability for 
“any negotiated term” of a tribally-approved agreement, while 
perhaps fair in light of the lack of federal approval of any such 
agreement, has been viewed as a diminishment of the federal trust 
responsibility.181 This perception is consistent with the zero-sum 
conception of federal and tribal authority as it demands that the 
assumption of authority by tribes be accompanied by a 
corresponding elimination of federal responsibility. Similarly, the 
regulations implementing ITEDSDA allow tribes to assume 
“activities normally carried out by the Department [of the Interior] 
except for inherently Federal functions.”182 In doing so, the 
regulations sought to preserve some portion of the federal end of the 
federal-tribal axis; however, the regulations failed to define what 
those functions might be. Lastly, the ability of a tribe to enter a 
TERA hinges upon the tribe’s capacity, as determined by the 
Secretary, to carry out the TERA’s functions.183 By establishing an 
overly complex application and assessment process for that 
determination without a correspondingly strong commitment to 
work with tribes to build such capacity, the ITEDSDA further 
confirms the zero-sum approach. With a dozen years of no success, 
some question the continuing worthiness of TERAs and the 
ITEDSDA approach.184 
Since the HEARTH Act’s 2012 enactment, over twenty 
tribes have assumed responsibility for review and approval of 
surface leases on their lands.185 Of these tribes, however, as of early 
2017, only a few had regulations approved for wind and solar or 
solar resource leases.186 Like ITEDSDA’s adoption of the zero-sum 
                                                
181 See, e.g. Kronk, supra note 153, at 828–34. 
182 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c) (2014). 
183 25 U.S.C. §3504(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
184 See, e.g., S. 2132, Indian Tribal Energy Dev. & Self-Determination Act 
Amendments of 2014: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 4 (2014) (Statement of Hon. Kevin Washburn, Assistant Secretary—
Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior). 
185 See HEARTH Act of 2012, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/HEARTH/index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/MW3A-C8ZN]. 
186 Id.; HEARTH Act Approval of Ohkay Owingeh Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 
1638-01 (Jan. 13, 2016); HEARTH Act Approval of Makah Indian Tribe of the 
Makah Indian Reservation Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,836-01 (Aug. 26, 
2015); HEARTH Act Approval of Gila River Indian Community Regulations, 
80 Fed. Reg. 77,655-01 (Dec. 15, 2015). According to the GAO, as of March 
2015, only one utility-scale wind facility was in operation on tribal land, with 
one more such facility and one utility-scale solar facility then-under 
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approach to authorizing tribal authority, the HEARTH Act includes 
similar tribal environmental review process requirements and 
waiver of federal liability.187 Beyond these limitations, the 
HEARTH Act does not provide a tribe with comprehensive 
authority to pursue energy development, as it addresses only surface 
leasing authority and does not allow tribes to approve rights-of-way 
that might be necessary and incidental to such surface development. 
Although the ITEDSDA and HEARTH Acts represent the 
most advanced evolution of the federal-tribal relationship as it 
relates to energy development, their shortcomings have led to a 
number of recent proposals to further reform or build upon their 
approaches. Most prominent among the legislative efforts were two 
such proposals included in comprehensive national energy policy 
bills passed in 2016.188 The Senate’s version of that bill focused on 
enhancing and streamlining the TERA process by simplifying the 
capacity determination and application process while also making 
funding available to tribes that assume greater authority pursuant to 
a TERA.189 That version would have also broadened the 
applicability of TERAs by including tribal authority for approving a 
wider range of energy-related agreements and removing the 
requirement of secretarial approval for certain such agreements 
entered into between a tribe and a “tribal energy development 
organization” that has been certified as such by the Secretary.190 In 
reporting the bill, which later became part of the broader Energy 
                                                
construction. By comparison, since 2005, 686 utility-scale wind projects and 
778 utility-scale solar projects have been constructed on non-tribal lands. GAO-
15-502, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
187 See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Dev. 
Under the HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, but Collectively Deficient, 
Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1053–70 (2013). 
188 N. Am. Energy Security & Infrastructure Act of 2016, S. 2012, 114th Cong. 
(as passed by House with changes, May 25, 2016). 
189 Id. § 6013(a)(4)(B)(ii)(II)(ee) (for capacity determination purposes, adding 
the reduced requirement that the tribe certify that it has carried out a 638 
contract or compact for three years prior to applying for a TERA or that the tribe 
has “substantial experience [or participation] in the administration, review or 
evaluation of energy resource leases or agreements”); id. § 6013(a)(6) 
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to make funding available to a tribe 
that has assumed authority and functions pursuant to a TERA). 
190 Id. § 6013(a)(1)(A)(iii) (including pooling, unitization, or communitization 
agreements within the types of agreements that a tribe could approve pursuant to 
a TERA); id. § 6013(a)(1)(b) (adding an exception from Secretarial approval for 
leases or business agreements executed “by [a] tribe and a tribal energy 
development organization” certified by the Secretary; id. § 6013(a)(6) 
(establishing certification criteria for the Secretary’s review of Tribal Energy 
Development Organizations). 
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Policy Modernization Act of 2016 out of his Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee, Chairman John Barrasso specifically noted the findings 
of the 2015 GAO Report and described how the proposed 
amendments aimed “to provide direction and clarity” for the TERA 
process.191 
In addition to its TERA-focused provisions, the Senate 
Indian energy proposal included a number of miscellaneous 
provisions, including proposals to reform and streamline the federal 
appraisal process for tribal energy or mineral resources held in 
trust192 and to authorize federally-supported tribal weatherization 
and biomass demonstration projects.193 In addition, just as the 
expansion of the Navajo Nation’s (the Nation) ability to enter 
surface leases without secretarial approval served as a precursor to 
the HEARTH Act,194 the bill proposed a further expansion of the 
Nation’s surface leasing authority to include the ability to enter into 
a mineral lease without secretarial approval, provided the Secretary 
had approved the Nation’s leasing regulations.195 The proposed 
provision would effectively apply the HEARTH Act approach to 
Navajo trust mineral development instead of the more complicated 
TERA application and capacity determination process. But, by 
simply adding mineral leases to the Nation’s existing surface leasing 
authority, the proposal would not require that the Nation adopt 
regulations consistent with the federal mineral development 
regulations under the IMLA and IMDA.196 
While the Senate took a TERA-focused approach with the 
addition of a HEARTH Act-type proposal for the Navajo Nation in 
its miscellaneous provisions, the House took a much more 
scattershot approach in passing a number of provisions dedicated to 
Indian energy that did not reference the ITEDSDA or TERAs at 
all.197 Though the House version included a few of the same 
miscellaneous provisions as the Senate version, such as the appraisal 
                                                
191 S. REP. NO. 114-149, at 2 (2015). 
192 S. 2012, 112th Cong. § 6204. 
193 Id. §§6202–6203. 
194 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
195 S. 2012, § 6205. 
196 See 25 U.S.C. § 415(e)(3) (2012) (requiring the Secretary’s approval of tribal 
regulations that are consistent with the Secretary’s surface leasing regulations, 
i.e., 25 C.F.R. Part 162, without reference to the IMLA or IMDA regulations, 25 
C.F.R. parts 211 and 225, respectively). 
197 See Division C, Title IV, Native Am. Energy Act, S. 2012, 112th Cong. §§ 
4001–4009 (May 25, 2016) (engrossed amendment House).  
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reform, biomass demonstration project, and the Navajo Nation 
mineral leasing provisions, the heart of the House proposal was 
aimed at narrowing the applicability and scope of the NEPA and 
judicial review of projects on tribal lands.198 These provisions would 
limit the environmental review of federal actions related to activities 
on Indian lands to allow only tribal members, local residents or 
governments within the area affected by the activity to comment on 
the proposed action.199 Similarly, the bill sought to significantly 
limit the availability of judicial review for “energy related actions” 
and challenges to the federal approval of energy-related activity on 
tribal lands.200 Thus, although the report accompanying the House 
version pointed to many of the same challenges at which the 
Senate’s proposal had aimed,201 the House sought to reform specific 
aspects of the federal role in Indian energy development while the 
Senate proposed enhancing the TERA avenue for tribes to seek 
greater control. Though the omnibus energy policy legislation and 
legislative efforts in the 114th Congress died,202 they are the basis of 
additional legislative efforts to reform the TERA process and 
address other tribal energy issues in the 115th Congress.203 As such, 
these proposals remain narrowly focused like their zero-sum 
predecessors.  
In addition to legislative proposals for reform, officials 
within the Department of the Interior also have sought to reform the 
manner in which their department, and the agencies therein, carry 
out the trust responsibility within the existing statutory framework 
for Federal Indian energy policy. As with the efforts at legislative 
reform, the GAO’s 2015 report on Indian energy development 
provided an outline of administrative issues and gave the 
Department of Interior a number of recommendations on which to 
                                                
198 Id. §§ 4004–05. 
199 Id. § 4004. 
200 Id. § 4005 (proposing a 60-day statute of limitations, narrowed appellate 
review, and limited the availability of fee recovery for such actions). Then-
Representative Zinke voted in favor of moving the bill from committee and the 
bill as a whole. 161 Cong. Rec. H6911 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015)).  
201 Compare, S. REP. NO. 114-149, at 1-3 (2015), with H. REP. NO. 114-276, at 
1-5 (2015). 
202 See Devin Henry, Speaker’s Office: No Energy Bill this Year, THE HILL 
(December 7, 2016, 5:04 PM EST), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/309312-speakers-office-no-energy-bill-this-year [https://perma.cc/ 
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203 Indian Tribal Energy Dev. & Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2017, 
S. 245, 115th Cong. (2017) (Senate Indian Affairs Committee voted on Feb. 8, 
2017 to move the bill out of Committee).  
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base its reforms, but it largely avoided any consideration of the 
broader structure of the trust relationship.204 Instead, the GAO 
detailed the challenges facing the Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding 
that agency’s lack of comprehensive data concerning the ownership 
and use of Indian minerals, its lack of any defined or accountable 
process for the agency’s review and approval of energy-related 
transactions, and the dearth of well-qualified agency staff to handle 
those procedures.205 Based on these concerns, the GAO report 
recommended that the BIA Director further develop the agency’s 
data and information system and also “develop a documented 
process to track its review and response times.”206 In response, the 
Department noted its efforts to implement a new software package 
that would, in the Department’s view, address the information 
shortage, but concurred with the need to develop an effective 
process for tracking and accounting for the review and approval of 
energy-related transactional documents.207 In addition to responding 
to the issues raised in the GAO Report, the Department also touted 
its efforts to establish an Indian Energy Service Center (IESC), 
which would include representatives from various federal agencies 
involved in Indian energy development to “provide expertise, policy 
guidance, standardized procedures, and technical assistance across 
a broad spectrum of services.”208 As noted by Interior’s Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary at the time, the collaborative approach 
envisioned for the IESC would “reflect the spirit of the White House 
Council on Native American Affairs,”209 which was created by 
Executive Order in June 2013 in an effort “to improve the 
coordination of Federal programs and the use of resources available 
to tribal communities.”210  
                                                
204 See GAO-15-502, supra note 11, at 18–24. 
205 See GAO-15-502, supra note 11, at 18–24. 
206 See GAO-15-502, supra note 11, at 36. 
207 See GAO-15-502, supra note 11, at 46–47. 
208 The GAO Report on Indian Energy Dev.: Poor Mgmt. by BIA has Hindered 
Dev. on Indian Lands: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th 
Cong. 13 (2015) (statement of Frank Rusco, Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office). 
209 Id. at 11. 
210 Establishing the White House Council on Native Am. Affairs, Exec. Order 
No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013). The Council also includes an 
energy subgroup, chaired by the Secretaries of Interior and Energy, focused on 
further coordination of these issues. See White House Council on Native Am. 
Affairs, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https: 
//www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/press_release/pdf/idc1-
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Notwithstanding these administrative reform efforts, a more 
recent GAO review determined that more is needed in order to 
effectively address the barriers to the efficient administration of the 
federal trust responsibility for Indian energy development.211 
Despite the spirit of collaboration envisioned by the White House 
Council on Native American Affairs, the GAO in 2016 identified a 
number of issues that may be preventing effective collaboration 
among the members of the Council’s Energy Subgroup, including a 
dearth of sustained leadership, failures on the part of participating 
agencies to dedicate adequate and consistent resources, and the lack 
of a documented process or framework for collaboration.212 
Similarly, the GAO pointed out that the BIA’s development of the 
IESC failed to “follow some leading practices or adhere to agency 
guidance during [its] early stages … which may impact its 
effectiveness.”213 These failures included the lack of an identified 
lead agency, failure to effectively involve employees and their input, 
and not documenting the basis for key decisions about the formation 
and development of the IESC.214 Following on its 2015 findings, the 
GAO’s 2016 report also noted continuing high vacancy rates at key 
BIA offices and confirmed that some offices “may not have staff 
with the level of competence that allows them to review some 
energy development documents.”215 Compounding these 
challenges, according to the GAO, is the BIA’s lack of detailed 
workforce information, which prevents a comprehensive analysis of 
workforce skills, needs, and competencies.216 In summing up this 
challenge, the GAO aptly described the struggles faced by Federal 
Indian energy policy more broadly: “[w]ithout current workforce 
information on key skills needed for energy development, tribal 
goals and priorities, and potential workforce resource gaps, BIA 
may not have the right people with the right skills doing the right 
jobs in the right place at the right time and cannot provide decision 
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214 GAO-17-43, supra note 10, at 19–23.  
215 GAO-17-43, supra note 10, at 23. 
216 GAO-17-43, supra note 10, at 25. The GAO Report includes various 
examples of the challenges posed by a lack of qualified staff, including a 
statement from the BIA Director “that BIA agency offices generally do not have 
the expertise to help tribes with solar and wind development because it is rare 
that such skills are needed.” GAO-17-43, supra note 10, at 24. 
  
 
75 
makers with information on its staffing needs going forward.”217 
None of the GAO’s findings or recommendations looked at the 
balance of the federal government’s trust responsibility; nor did the 
GAO Report make any proposals for significant reform in that 
regard. 
Thus, a century and a quarter after the 1891 leasing act, the 
structure, and implementation of the federal government’s trust 
responsibilities for the leasing and development of tribal land and 
energy resources remain in flux. Though federal priorities have 
shifted from the destruction and exploitation of tribal resources 
toward promoting the twin aims of tribal self-determination and 
economic development,218 tribes continue to express frustration 
about both the statutory framework and its administrative 
implementation.219 Much of the frustration results from the limited 
way in which that framework has treated the federal-tribal 
relationship and the narrow means available for tribes to assume 
greater authority over energy development. 
                                                
217 GAO-17-43, supra note 10, at 25.  
218 The most recent statement of federal policy on these issues came from 
Congress in enacting the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, which included the 
following findings and reaffirmation of federal policy: 
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.  
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Stat. 432 (2016) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601–02). 
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At one end of this debate are those who characterize the 
shortcomings of current policy in terms of federal overreach and the 
need to minimize the federal presence.220 This characterization is 
consistent with recent proposals for regulatory reform,221 but is also 
cloaked in the language of promoting tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.222 Nonetheless, for many in Indian Country, these 
arguments sound like the diminishment of the federal trust 
responsibility and therefore echo the specters of allotment and 
termination.223  
At the other end of the spectrum are tribes, tribal citizens, 
environmental groups, and others concerned about the failure of the 
federal government to adequately protect their trust resources from 
the degradation and threat posed by energy development.224 The 
zero-sum nature of Federal Indian energy policy also fails to serve 
these interests. Where federal trust responsibility remains for the 
review and approval of energy-related transactions, such as under 
the IMLA or IMDA, the procedural requirements of NEPA, 
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leases and permits by both BIA and BLM “have run roughshod over Pawnee 
natural resource protection laws, disregarded a tribal moratorium on new oil and 
gas approvals, and violated the agencies’ trust responsibilities to the Pawnee.”) 
Though not specifically related to energy development in Indian Country, the 
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including the ESA and other federal standards, may provide some 
assurance to those concerned about the environmental impacts.225 
Given the federal-tribal relationship, however, the conduct and 
result of those reviews may be deferential to tribal government 
decision-making, which may or may not adequately account for the 
concerns of environmental organizations.226 Conversely, the 
reliance upon federal statutes as a basis for challenging tribal 
development decisions effectively denigrates tribal status while 
reifying federal supremacy. Professor Ezra Rosser examined this 
conflict in detail with regard to environmental permitting of a coal 
mine and power plant supported by the Navajo Nation, explaining 
that “[t]he current federal permitting process . . . seems to put 
environmental organizations in the position of either having to give 
up on their larger environmental goals or participate in the 
colonialism of federal environmental policy.”227  
Despite the efforts of more recent initiatives—like 
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act—to remove the federal 
government from the review and approval process for energy-
related or surface leasing transactions, each of those statutes requires 
that tribes essentially adopt the federal review process, a NEPA-
lite,228 and ultimately allow for federal review of alleged non-
compliance on the part of tribes exercising such authority.229 These 
limitations restrict the ability of tribal regulatory schemes to respond 
to the “quantitatively and qualitatively different risks and impacts” 
of energy development on tribal lands, including risks to tribal 
homelands, culturally significant sites, and environments.230 
Without a broader conception of the federal-tribal relationship and 
a trust responsibility that allows for more tribal flexibility, these 
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risks are left to federal agencies, federal courts, and federal 
regulations to resolve. 
In addition, many tribal citizens have expressed concern 
about the willingness and ability of their own tribal governments to 
provide similar protection for tribal resources in the event that the 
federal government authorizes broader tribal oversight.231 These 
concerns relate less to the balance of federal or tribal authority over 
the development and instead focus on the effectiveness of such 
authority in responding to the concerns of local tribal citizens. While 
the challenges facing tribal governments are many and varied, the 
history of federal involvement and oversight, particularly through 
the establishment of IRA constitutions and governmental structures, 
often results in a significant disconnect between the structures of 
tribal governments and the concerns of tribal citizens.232 While 
tribes across the country have begun to reconsider and reshape their 
governments to better respond to this potential divide, the zero-sum 
nature of Federal Indian energy policy remains narrowly focused 
upon the tribal capacity to assume the federal regulatory role233 
rather than the sustainability and effectiveness of tribal governance 
within tribal communities. 
Therefore, for many in Indian Country, it may matter less 
whether the federal or local tribal government has authority for 
authorizing, approving, and regulating energy development so long 
as whichever entity with authority is adequately listening to and 
addressing their concerns. Thus, though the axis around which 
Federal Indian energy policy has turned has always been the 
foundational (and illusory) notion that the federal government’s 
role, and corresponding trust responsibility, must be balanced 
against the role or interests of the tribes involved, the history of 
Federal Indian energy policy has demonstrated the shortcomings of 
this conception. With some notable but mostly singular 
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exceptions,234 Federal Indian energy policy has largely failed to 
successfully promote sustained economic development and tribal 
self-determination. While legislative and administrative reform 
efforts continue,235 they primarily focus on shifting the existing 
federal regulatory review and approval process over to tribes 
without a broader consideration of the shortcomings of that process, 
the challenges it presents, or whether the process will even serve 
tribal interests. To overcome this myopia and the likely failure of 
such reforms, the remainder of this article proposes a new approach, 
one based on a broader view of the trust responsibility and 
unchained from the narrow proposals of the past.  
 
IV. THE THREAT OF OUR TIMES AND THE PROMISE  
OF REFORM THROUGH RECOMMITMENT TO  
A BROADER TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
 
To support a broader view of reform for Federal Indian 
energy policy, this section begins by addressing a few fundamental 
hurdles. First, reforming Federal Indian energy policy, like Indian 
policy more broadly, demands consideration in a non-partisan 
manner. The federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian 
Country is not the product of a liberal or conservative agenda; rather, 
it is rooted in the foundation of the constitution and federal law. 
Therefore, political ideology can take a backseat to the question of 
upholding the trust relationship; however, political issues and 
partisan ideologies unconnected to Indian affairs can and have 
interfered with the federal government’s willingness and ability to 
carry out its trust responsibility. Second, new proposals must also 
overcome the zero-sum history of federal-tribal relations and 
separate the assumption and exercise of greater tribal authority from 
a diminished federal role. Instead, the federal role must evolve to 
                                                
234 Jonathan Thompson, The Ute Paradox, HIGH CNTY. NEWS (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.12/the-ute-paradox?b_start:int=2#body 
[https://perma.cc/DB74-3VK8]; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Press Release No. 11-1388, 
United States and Osage Tribe Announce $380 Million Settlement of Tribal 
Trust Lawsuit, (October 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-
and-osage-tribe-announce-380-million-settlement-tribal-trust-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/UN2E-DPSJ]. 
235 See, e.g., Indian Tribal Energy Dev. & Self-Determination Act Amendments 
of 2017, S. 245, 115th Cong. (2017); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
HIGH-RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE 
SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS, GAO-17-317, 34–35 (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf [http://perma.cc/6D47-24WP].  
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better accommodate and respond to the unique needs and concerns 
of tribes beyond the narrow axis of federal versus tribal oversight. 
 
A. The Threat of Political Ideology 
 
The history of federal Indian policy demonstrates a 
commitment by both conservatives and liberals alike to support and 
promote tribal interests and the federal-tribal relationship.236The 
lack of a partisan divide remains a hallmark of the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, which routinely reviews and approves legislation 
introduced and co-sponsored by members of both political 
parties.237 In fact, that Committee’s most recent action on Federal 
Indian energy policy, approving a bill amending the ITEDSDA, was 
bi-partisan in nature.238  
Notwithstanding the non-partisan nature of the federal-tribal 
relationship, however, federal Indian law and policy often get 
tangled up in—and suffer from—partisan political interests. For 
example, consistent with the non-partisan nature of tribal self-
                                                
236 Though built on statements from both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 
President Richard M. Nixon was the first to formally commit the federal 
government to the current era of tribal self-determination. See Richard Nixon, 
Special Message to the Cong. on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 
1970). Since that time, nearly every President, regardless of political affiliation, 
has recommitted the federal government to this principle. Gerald Ford, 
Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 4, 1975); Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union 
Annual Message to the Cong., THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 25, 1979), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32735 [https://perma. 
cc/RZ2T-MFZX]; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, THE AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 24, 1983), http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/?pid=41665 [https://perma.cc/PP8T-5KGC]; George Bush, Statement 
Reaffirming the Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship Between the Fed. Gov’t & Indian 
Tribal Governments, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 14, 1991), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/index.php?pid=19695&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/54ZM-5S9Q]; William J. 
Clinton, Remarks to Native Am. & Native Alaskan Tribal Leaders, THE AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (April 29, 1994), http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50070 [https://perma.cc/8BMW-CQFN]; George W. Bush, 
Memorandum on Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship with Tribal Governments, THE 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2004), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64553&st=&st1= 
[https://perma.cc/4EZR-RK57]; Barack Obama, Statement of Admin. Policy, 
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111336 [https://perma.cc/AMC4-85RR].  
237 Business Meeting, 161 CONG. REC. D76 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2015); Business 
Meeting, 163 CONG. REC. D89 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2017). 
238 S. REP. NO. 115-84 (2017). 
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determination, President Reagan’s 1983 Statement on Indian Affairs 
committed his administration to “remove the obstacles to self-
government by creating a more favorable environment for the 
development of healthy reservation economies.”239 Echoing the 
preceding decades of Federal Indian energy policy, President 
Reagan’s policy touted the need to develop both tribal governments 
and economies through energy resource development and suggested 
that the role of the federal government was to encourage such 
development in a manner consistent with “Indian values and 
priorities.”240 But, contemporaneously with such worthy statements 
on the federal-tribal relationship, the federal budget for Indian 
affairs was being drastically cut,241 leading some to dub the Reagan 
administration’s approach to Indian policy “termination by 
accountants.”242 These cuts were consistent with broader economic 
policies of the Reagan era,243 but as a result, tribal self-determination 
and economic development suffered,244 and the BIA and IHS 
budgets were set on a path of decades of diminished funding.245  
Reform of Federal Indian energy policy must avoid being 
viewed as or falling prey to a partisan political divides and broader 
politically-driven agendas. As demonstrated above, the federal trust 
responsibility in the area of Federal Indian energy policy has long 
been conceived of as support for both tribal self-determination and 
economic development. Though challenges remain in meeting those 
goals, reform of such policy toward those ends cannot be cabined by 
conservative or liberal principles. 
 
 
                                                
239 Reagan, supra note 236. 
240 Id. 
241 See, e.g., Select S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, Analysis of the Budget 
Pertaining to Indian Affairs Fiscal Year 1982, S. REP. NO. 79-735, at 5 (1981) 
(showing a proposed budget cut of over $70M from BIA’s budget),  
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754070363753;view=1up;seq=17 
(last visited December 05, 2017).  
242 C. Patrick Morris, Termination by Accountants: The Reagan Indian Policy, 
16 POL’Y STUD. J. 731 (1988). 
243 Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 20, 
1981), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=43130 [https://perma.cc/F8U5-8TEM]. 
244 ALLISON III, supra note 106, at 174–75. 
245 See National Cong. of Am. Indians, An Honorable Budget for Indian Cnty.: 
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2014, at 20, 
http://www.ncai.org/ncai_2014_budget_request.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/FCZ8-NXHM].  
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B. The Threat of a Continued Zero-Sum Approach 
 
To achieve successful reform, Federal Indian energy policy 
must also break free from its zero-sum past. Throughout its history, 
Federal Indian energy policy has relied upon a singular view of 
federal competence and corresponding tribal incompetence.246 As 
demonstrated supra, the policy has evolved to allow tribes greater 
authority only where they can demonstrate that they have overcome 
the latter and are able to carry out federal functions in a manner 
similar to or “consistent with” the federal government.247 This 
approach is consistent with the broader approach of the self-
determination era, in which tribes have contracted to take over 
formerly federal programs, services, functions, and activities but 
must meet federal performance standards to do so.248  
While there are many benefits for tribes in taking on such 
responsibilities,249 the approach demands consideration of a reduced 
federal responsibility consistent with greater tribal authority. In 
addition, tribes are authorized to fulfill the role of the federal 
government in the manner of the federal government, which has 
often failed Indian beneficiaries.250 Perhaps most perniciously for 
reform efforts, viewing the balance of authority over energy 
development in Indian Country as a federal-tribal dichotomy lends 
credence to a view of reform in which the federal government helps 
tribes by “getting out of the way,” which then justifies reduced 
federal spending and involvement in carrying out the trust 
responsibility.251 In assessing whether the federal government is 
                                                
246 See, e.g., Gover, supra note 30, at 318, 355. 
247 Indian Mineral Dev. Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2107 (2012); HEARTH Act of 2012,  
§ 2(h)(3)(B)(i); Indian Tribal Energy & Self-Determination Act,  
§ 3504(e)(2)(B)(i). 
248 Indian Self Determination & Educational Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-638, 
§102(a)(1)–(2), 88 Stat. 2206 (1975) (For example, the standards by which the 
Secretary of the Interior can decline a tribe’s proposal to enter a self-
determination contract include that the service to be performed by the tribe “will 
not be satisfactory,” or that “adequate protection of trust resources is not 
assured.”). 
249 See, e.g., Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, 
& Future of Tribal Self-Governance under the Indian Self-Determination & 
Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014). 
250 See, e.g., Class Action Settlement Agreement, Cobell v. Salazar, Civil Case 
No. 1:96CV01285-JR (Dist. D.C. Dec. 7, 2009), https://naturalresources. 
house.gov/uploadedfiles/cobellsettlementagreement_120709.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/Q6AH-2PST]; LINOWES COMM. HEARING, supra note 110. 
251 This sentiment echoes President Reagan’s Statement on Indian Affairs and 
has been resurrected in more recent statements by representatives of President 
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liable for damages resulting from its failure to ensure that tribal 
interests are protected when approving IMLA leases, the Supreme 
Court relied upon a similar view of the federal-tribal dichotomy, 
noting that “[i]mposing on the Government a fiduciary duty to 
oversee management … would not have served” that statute’s 
purpose of promoting tribal self-determination.252  
 While some tribes support the reduction and streamlining of 
the federal oversight of tribal energy development, that support 
recognizes the importance of tribal capacity in the management and 
oversight of development.253 More nuanced than the zero-
sum/federal-tribal dichotomy approach, tribal criticism is largely 
focused on the manner in which the federal trust responsibility is 
carried out, which, in the tribal view, can frustrate tribal interests.254 
This criticism is borne out by audit reports demonstrating the 
shortcomings of federal energy management, including the lack of 
accurate data and information, dearth of qualified staff in 
appropriate positions, and lack of accountability or timeframes.255 
 Consistent with these reviews and tribal criticism, the focus 
of reforming Federal Indian energy policy must be the manner in 
which the federal government carries out its responsibilities, not 
                                                
Trump’s Native American Affairs Coalition and within the House of 
Representatives. See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia & Anna Palmer, Trump Team 
Reaches out to Native Am., POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2016, 6:44 AM EST), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-team-native-americans-232719 
[http://perma.cc/HRN4-97RL]; Mullin Statement, supra note 222; Tribal 
Prosperity & Self-Determination Through Energy Dev.: Oversight Field 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 114th Cong. 2 (2017) [hereinafter 
Oversight Field Hearing]. 
252 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003).  
253 See Oversight Field Hearing, supra note 251, at 6 (statement of Hon. James 
“Mike” Olguin, Tribal Council Member, Southern Ute Indian Tribe) (“It is 
perfectly clear that the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] does not have the data, 
resources, technological capabilities, or staffing to meet the needs of the tribe. 
Meanwhile, the tribe has the capability and, most importantly, the incentive to 
improve the situation.”) 
254 See Oversight Field Hearing, supra note 251, at 6. 
255 See, e.g., GAO-15-502, supra note 10, at 18–24. The experience of the 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe is particularly revealing in this regard. Alleged 
mismanagement of tribal energy resources on the part of the BIA’s Southern Ute 
Agency ultimately led to a review by the Dept. of Interior’s Office of Inspector 
General, whose report discusses the “challenges associated with initiating 
energy self-determination for a tribe with sophisticated energy practices.” 
DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS’ S. UTE AGENCY’S MGMT.OF THE S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE’S ENERGY RES., 
Rep. No. CR-EV-BIA-0011-2014, at 14 (Feb. 2016) https://www.doioig. 
gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/CREVBIA00112014Public.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/8W53-Y8WY].  
  
 
84 
simply how to reduce those responsibilities. Instead of reducing the 
federal role in order to increase tribal self-determination, for 
example, a realignment of federal priorities with regard to Federal 
Indian energy policy could result in an expanded federal role and 
increased tribal self-determination. Only by dismissing political 
ideology and moving beyond the zero-sum approach can reform 
successfully answer the central question of Federal Indian energy 
policy for nearly a century—how can the federal government best 
support tribal sovereignty and economic development through 
energy development?  
 
C. Proposing Reform: Stepping Toward a New  
Trust Relationship 
  
Fundamentally, reforming Federal Indian energy policy to 
serve the twin aims of tribal self-determination and economic 
development will require that the federal government first take a 
step toward Indian tribes rather than stepping back or out of the way. 
With rare exception,256 tribes demand greater legal, regulatory, and 
technical capacities to ensure effective tribal management and 
oversight of energy development. Though ITEDSDA recognized 
these needs and authorized grants to tribes to develop such 
capacities,257 tribal needs still outstrip federal support.258 In addition 
to being underfunded, ITEDSDA’s authorization for appropriations 
to fund these grants expired in 2016.259 A recommitment to 
                                                
256 See DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, supra note 255. 
257 25 U.S.C. § 3502(a) (2012). 
258 According to Interior’s FY2017 budget justification, the Department was able 
to fund less than half (10/22) of the Tribal Energy Development Capacity 
(TEDC) grant requests it received for FY2015, providing only $1.5M of over 
$3M requested. Dep’t of the Interior: Indian Affairs, Budget Justifications and 
Performance Information, Fiscal Year 2017, IA-CED-10 (2016) https://www. 
doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/FY2017_IA_Budget_Justification.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/ZKF3-WDCW]. The FY2015 TEDC grants that were funded 
supported a variety of legal and technical development projects. Id. at 9. The 
Department’s Division of Energy and Minerals Development (DEMD) also 
provides direct technical assistance to tribes seeking energy development 
projects. See Division of Energy & Mineral Dev., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/ieed/division-energy-and-mineral-
development [https://perma.cc/7FEY-YWYE].  
259 25 U.S.C. § 3502(a)(3); see also Indian Country’s Priorities for Fed. Energy 
Legislation, Resolution No. SD-015-38 (Oct. 2015) (calling for reauthorization 
and expansion of the TEDC appropriations), http://www.ncai. 
org/attachments/Resolution_qMHMstHTzqxRxkfyszNHlJtQWsJwCTsRfxceShl
ONcPiSBAVith_SD-15-038.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4R7-S8D5]. 
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expanding and enhancing the federal government’s support for tribal 
capacity development is a necessary first step toward reform.
 Importantly, however, a commitment to financial and other 
support for building tribal capacity must avoid the pitfalls of the 
“Planner’s Approach,” a term coined by the Harvard Project on 
American Economic Development (HPAIED) to describe the 
failures of various federal programs seeking to support tribal 
economic development.260 According to one HPAIED Research 
Affiliate, “[t]he Planner’s Approach was simplistic in treating 
economic development as a fundamental question of resources and 
expertise, as opposed to one of incentives and institutions.”261 
Instead of such a narrow approach, HPAIED, after conducting 
numerous studies of economic development across Indian Country, 
promotes a “Nation Building” approach emphasizing the 
importance of stable tribal governmental institutions, the 
responsiveness of those institutions to tribal citizens and culture, and 
the importance of tribal sovereignty.262 Considering these factors in 
the design and development of effective federal support for tribal 
capacity building would enhance the long-term stability and 
effectiveness of such support. Therefore, the recommitment to 
supporting tribal capacity building must take a long-term “Nation 
Building” approach, including longer-term grant programs and 
effective measures for success and accountability. 
Beyond capacity building, the statutory framework for 
federal oversight and approval of energy development in Indian 
Country also requires reform. To maximize flexibility, the current 
range of options for such development, including the IMLA, the 
IMDA, TERAs and the HEARTH Act, should be retained; however, 
a new paradigm is needed to overcome the deficiencies of these 
current options.263 As with federal support for building tribal 
capacity, statutory reform requires federal engagement with tribes 
and tribal priorities and the development of options for tribes to 
tailor their own authorities without rigidly conforming to the 
interests or objectives of the federal government. This demand for 
                                                
260 Oversight Field Hearing, supra note 251, at 26 (statement of Eric Henson, 
Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon, Research Affiliate, Harvard Project 
on American Indian Economic Development). 
261 Oversight Field Hearing, supra note 251, at 26. 
262 Oversight Field Hearing, supra note 251, at 27–28; See Stephen Cornell and 
Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the Dev. of Native Nations: One Works, The 
Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS (Miriam Jorgensen, Ed., 2007). 
263 See supra notes180-189 and accompanying text. 
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flexibility aligns with the call from former Assistant Secretary 
Kevin Gover that Congress should authorize the Department of the 
Interior to negotiate agreements with tribes—on a tribe-by-tribe 
basis—pursuant to which each tribe could “retain those aspects of 
the trust that [it] finds useful and desirable and eliminate those that 
[it does] not want.”264  
The shortcomings of the HEARTH Act and ITEDSDA’s 
TERAs demonstrate the need to consider Gover’s concept in 
reforming Federal Indian energy policy. While a number of tribes 
have taken advantage of the additional authority to review and 
approve surface leases under the HEARTH Act, including leases for 
solar and wind energy-related projects, the only authority that those 
tribes are exercising was created by the federal government for itself 
in the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act.265 In addition, the HEARTH 
Act demands that tribes carry out that authority “consistent with” 
the manner in which the federal government would have done so 
and provide an environmental review process allowing for public 
review of and input on proposed tribal decisions.266 Setting aside 
whether such procedures and requirements could be effectively 
adopted by tribal governmental institutions—including 
considerations such as cultural match—the additional effect of those 
requirements is the transfer of administrative burden and expense 
from the federal government to tribal governments. Tribes must, 
therefore, weigh those additional costs and burdens and the 
management of a regulatory scheme that may or may not serve tribal 
interests against the potential benefits resulting from the removal of 
federal approval requirements for each lease. While some tribes 
have decided that the benefits of assuming that authority outweighs 
                                                
264 Gover, supra note 30, at 359. 
265 See generally HEARTH ACT of 2012; see supra notes162-173.  
266 25 U.S.C. § 415(h)(3)(b). In this regard, the HEARTH Act is somewhat 
analogous to the ability of tribes to be delegated federal environmental 
regulatory authority under the “treatment as a state” (or TAS) provisions of the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, pursuant to which some tribes have 
assumed the responsibility for environmental regulation but have largely done so 
by the mirroring or maintaining consistency with the pre-existing federal 
regulatory scheme. See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative 
Envtl. ‘Laboratories,” 86 COLO. L. REV. 789, 816–817 (2015) (“tribes that have 
codified environmental laws as a result of [TAS] status [under the Clean Air 
Act] do not appear to be departing in any significant respect from federal 
laws.”); Id. at 817 (“there is substantial similarity between the tribal and federal 
water quality standards [adopted under the TAS provisions of the Clean Water 
Act], as the tribes are required to meet the federal minimums, but there are 
occasional differences.”) (Citations omitted). 
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the disadvantages, the HEARTH Act prevents a more flexible 
allocation of the burdens and benefits between tribes and their 
federal trustee. 
The potential authority to be assumed by a tribe pursuant to 
a TERA is broader than that allowed by the HEARTH Act,267 but 
the conditions associated with negotiating and assuming such an 
authority are both more stringent and less defined. For example, the 
ITEDSDA’s tribal capacity requirements pose a significant hurdle 
to TERA eligibility, but, unlike the HEARTH Act, which offers 
tribes the opportunity to adopt an existing federal regulatory scheme 
for approving surface leases,268 ITEDSDA provides no comparable 
guides for developing tribal regulatory programs for a TERA. In 
addition, the ITEDSDA’s requirement that the federal government 
review and confirm a tribe’s capacity to enter a TERA echoes the 
post-IRA and IMLA days of BIA dominance and paternalism. Like 
tribal authority requirements under the HEARTH Act, however, the 
public review and input requirements for tribal regulations may or 
may not align with tribal institutional and cultural structures. And, 
also like tribes pursuing authority under the HEARTH Act, any tribe 
entering a TERA to assume broader approval authority is also taking 
on significant administrative costs and responsibilities to carry out 
those functions without any guarantee of financial support from the 
federal trustee. Therefore, while a TERA presents a tribe with the 
potential to assume a much broader range of authority than the 
HEARTH Act’s surface leasing structure, acquiring such flexibility 
is subject to much greater federal scrutiny and bureaucracy than the 
HEARTH Act’s relatively straightforward approach.  
Even though the HEARTH Act represents the furthest 
evolution of the trust relationship toward tribal authority, both the 
HEARTH Act and the TERA options still demand that tribes accept 
a trade-off between greater authority and the flexibility to define that 
authority as the tribe may see fit. Rather than requiring a tribal 
assumption of federal duties, the next evolution of the trust 
responsibility demands eliminating that trade-off and developing a 
broader avenue for bilateral federal and tribal coordination of tribal 
interests and federal trust obligations. Drawing on Gover’s notion of 
a negotiated trust, tribes should be empowered to work with their 
                                                
267 As described supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text, TERAs authorize 
tribal authority over a variety of energy-related agreements while the HEARTH 
Act is limited to surface leasing only. 
268 See 25 C.F.R. part 169 (2014).  
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federal trustee to establish a regulatory review and approval process 
that is consistent with tribal institutional, environmental, and 
cultural norms instead of pre-existing, historical, and potentially 
inconsistent federal conceptions of the how to serve tribal interests. 
The basis of Federal Indian energy policy should be a recognition 
that each tribe can propose how best to oversee and regulate or 
restrict development and then, with appropriate federal support, 
build or enhance the governmental institutions necessary for doing 
so. In negotiating the details of each such proposal, then, the federal 
government could work with the tribe to identify how tribal property 
and interests will be best protected, but importantly, neither the 
tribal nor the federal government should be bound to a specific 
regulatory scheme. Instead, with federal support, assistance, and, 
potentially, co-management, tribal governments will be able to 
develop their own energy policies, laws, rules and regulations as 
they see fit.  
 
D. Challenges to Reform 
 
As this article demonstrates, the evolution of the trust 
relationship in Federal Indian energy policy has been slow and 
incremental. Given this inertia, instant reform of the type proposed 
here is unlikely, but as shown in the next section, incremental 
progress toward such reform is ongoing and likely to continue. 
Nevertheless, there are challenges and potential drawbacks to the 
type of reform described herein.  
First, empowering tribes to develop, implement, and enforce 
their own regulatory approaches to the management of energy 
resources is likely to prompt concern on the part of neighboring 
communities and citizens. For example, depending on how the tribe 
chooses to consider, review, and approve projects related to such 
management, non-tribal members may not be informed or have an 
opportunity to comment on such management but may, nonetheless, 
face environmental, social, or economic burdens as a result of tribal 
decision-making. As noted above, both the HEARTH Act and the 
TERA options for enhancing tribal authority addressed this issue by 
requiring that tribes ensure public review and comment on lease or 
energy-related proposals prior to tribal approval.269 While some 
tribes may still include such opportunities in their regulatory 
                                                
269 See supra notes 181-188. 
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approach, others have objected to these requirements as infringing 
upon tribal sovereignty.270 Despite the apparent conflict between 
tribal sovereignty and these broader interests, reforming the federal-
tribal relationship to allow for a broader conception of the tribal role 
within Federal Indian energy policy would provide a middle road to 
balance these sometimes competing forces. As noted above,271 many 
tribes and tribal members already face internal conflicts over natural 
resource management within their existing governmental structures. 
These conflicts have led to turnover within tribal governments and 
further development of tribal government institutions to address the 
varied concerns of tribal citizens.272 Expanding the tribal presence 
in energy management could allow consideration of these issues and 
foster the development of stronger tribal institutions to address 
them. In turn, enhancing tribal institutions could provide additional 
avenues for dialogue between potentially competing for non-tribal 
interests and tribal officials, avenues that are largely absent in the 
existing zero-sum structure. Therefore, while conflicts over tribal 
decision-making will certainly continue, reform would allow for 
more robust tribal consideration of those conflicting views. 
Reform of the type described herein also presents some 
practical complications, particularly on the part of the federal 
government. How, for example, would the federal government 
negotiate its trust responsibilities on a tribe-by-tribe basis and 
account for potentially 567 different, unique, and diverse tribal 
demands? Similarly, the development of a broad range of tribal 
regulatory and legal structures could deter non-Indian investors or 
businesses seeking to bring much-needed investments to Indian 
Country. These concerns may prove illusory, however, as the 
existing diversity of tribal capabilities, interests, and priorities is 
unlikely to result in an overwhelming demand for such negotiations 
in the short term. As former Assistant Secretary Gover noted in 
                                                
270 Kronk Warner, supra note 187, at 1055–57. 
271 See supra notes 221–231 and accompanying text. 
272 The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota 
are a prime example of these developments. There, a new chairman was swept 
into office after concerns arose over the environmental impacts of energy 
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Change in Heart of Bakken Shale, ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www. 
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making his proposal for reform, “tribal consent is a sine qua non in 
the implementation of the policy,” and many tribes may be 
unwilling to pursue reform of the federal trust responsibility in light 
of more pressing tribal interests, such as law enforcement or 
providing other services to tribal members.273 But, without an 
opportunity to pursue a broader or negotiated federal-tribal 
relationship, tribes who do seek such reform are hamstrung in their 
efforts to do so. Therefore, an incremental and perhaps tribe-by-
specific-tribe approach to legislative efforts at reform may prove to 
be the best solution in the short-term, and a handful of proven 
success stories may pave the way for increased tribal interest in the 
future.274 Even without such tribal specific legislation, however, 
there are already some examples of reform, which the next section 
will address. 
 
V. POTENTIAL FIRST STEPS AND RELEVANCE  
BEYOND ENERGY POLICY 
 
While a more comprehensive legislative reform effort will 
be needed to promote and support tribal capacity, encourage 
development of tribal regulatory programs, and authorize the 
negotiation of federal-tribal agreements regarding energy resource 
management in Indian Country, recent tribal efforts demonstrate 
how such legislation could take shape and the type of negotiated 
federal-tribal agreement that might be possible.  
 
A. Broadening Trust Management and Negotiating  
Regulatory Authority 
 
The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act provides a potential 
starting point for legislative efforts toward such reform.275 That Act 
authorizes tribes to submit to the Secretary a plan for managing a 
trust asset and, so long as the tribe’s management would not violate 
                                                
273 Gover supra note 30, at 320.  
274 Such a strategy would parallel the development of the HEARTH Act, which 
began by Congress authorizing such a surface leasing structure for the Navajo 
Nation and later expanded to allow any tribe to pursue such authority. Compare 
25 U.S.C. § 415(e) (2012) (enacted in 2000 and authorizing leasing by the 
Navajo Nation), 25 U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012) the HEARTH Act, enacted in 2012, 
expanding such leasing to all federally recognized Indian tribes).  
275 Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, Pub. L. 114-178, 130 Stat. 432 (2016) 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601–36). 
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any federal laws applicable to that asset, the tribe could then assume 
such management authority, potentially even at a standard “less-
stringent … than the Secretary would otherwise require or adhere to 
in absence of an Indian trust asset management plan.”276 Unlike 
ITEDSDA or the HEARTH Act, the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act 
does not specifically require that a tribe adopt a particular regulatory 
framework or ensure a public review and comment process in 
managing a trust asset, other than forest resources or surface leasing 
already subject to a tribe’s HEARTH Act regulations.277 Though this 
Act focuses more specifically on the management of surface and 
timber resources by tribes,278 it presents an alternative model for 
Congress to consider beyond the current framework of Federal 
Indian energy policy. By acknowledging and allowing a willing and 
interested tribe to develop a plan for managing its own trust energy 
resources, such an alternative model would encourage a flexible 
federal-tribal relationship and promote the management and 
oversight of tribal energy resources in accordance with tribal 
interests and values. 
Resolution of one tribe’s recent legal challenge to the Bureau 
of Land Management’s (BLM) 2015 regulations regarding the use 
of hydraulic fracturing in energy development on tribal lands 
provides another example. Relying on the IRA and 25 C.F.R. section 
211.29,279 the Southern Ute Indian Tribe asserted that its own tribal 
regulations regarding hydraulic fracturing, adopted before the 
BLM’s new regulations were set to take effect, superseded those 
newer federal rules.280 Though a separate legal action resulted in the 
BLM’s regulations being temporarily set aside,281 the tribe and 
Department of the Interior continued to negotiate a settlement of the 
tribe’s challenge. Ultimately, the parties agreed to disagree over 
whether the tribe had the power to supersede the BLM rules; 
however, in recognition of their shared interest in “regulating 
hydraulic fracturing, based on their interest in both oil and gas 
                                                
276 25 U.S.C. § 5615(b). 
277 25 U.S.C. § 5614(b)(2). 
278 Id. §5614. 
279 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
280 Parties Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings, S. Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, et al., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01303-MSK (D. Colo. June 25, 2015). 
281 See Order on Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action, Wyoming v. 
United States Dep’t of the Interior, Civil Action No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, 2016 
WL 3509415 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016) vacated by Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 
1133 (10th Cir., Sept. 21, 2017). 
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development and environmental protection,” the tribe and 
Department of Interior agreed that the federal parties to the case 
would “recognize the tribe’s [hydraulic fracturing regulations] as the 
governing rules regulating hydraulic fracturing for all Indian lands 
within … the [Southern Ute] Reservation to the exclusion of [both] 
the BLM’s” previous hydraulic fracturing regulations and practices 
as well as the newer 2015 regulations.282 In the agreement, the 
Department of Interior further recognized that the tribe’s regulations 
met or exceeded the BLM’s own rules for regulating hydraulic 
fracturing operations.283 The parties also negotiated a separate 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to describe the “respective 
roles in cooperatively administering and enforcing the tribe’s 
[regulations] in conjunction with BLM’s regulations.”284  
Through both the Settlement Agreement and the MOA, the 
federal government recognized and agreed to help enforce the 
tribe’s regulations in lieu of the BLM’s otherwise applicable 
regulatory authority. In addition, through negotiation of those 
agreements, the federal government and the tribe identified and 
agreed upon aspects of federal oversight and regulatory authority 
that were workable, such as the BLM’s ongoing authority to review 
and approve applications for permits to drill, while elevating tribal 
decisions and priorities for how hydraulic fracturing would be 
conducted, even if those decisions were not consistent with federal 
rules. Thus, notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement over the 
statutory authority for the tribe’s supersession argument, these 
agreements provide a model for the negotiation and development of 
cooperative tribal-federal regulatory authority over tribal energy 
resources and management.285 These agreements also demonstrate 
that the federal government need not get out of the way to allow 
                                                
282 Settlement Agreement, S. Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, et 
al., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-01303-MSK, at 3–4 (filed March 13, 2017) 
(attached as Exhibit 1 Joint Motion to Dismiss and Incorporate Settlement 
Agreement).  
283 Id. at 4. 
284 Id. (Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Department of the Interior 
Bureau of Land Management and Southern Ute Indian Tribe Concerning the 
Administration and Enforcement of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe’s Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Chemical Disclosure Regulations, at 1, attached to Settlement 
Agreement). 
285 As described above, see supra note 255, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe is 
unique in its technical and regulatory capacity and, as noted in the Settlement 
Agreement, the Tribe’s extensive experience in managing energy production 
played an important part in the negotiations. 
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tribal oversight and management of energy resources. Instead, as 
this model shows, both governments can work together to ensure 
proper regulation, with the tribe taking the lead and implementing 
its own regulatory system that incorporates and reflects tribal 
interests and values. 
 
B. Reform beyond Federal Indian Energy Policy 
 
In some ways, proposing to expand the federal-tribal 
relationship with regard to Federal Indian energy policy tracks the 
evolution of tribal self-determination and self-governance programs 
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
(ISDEAA).286 Pursuant to that Act and its numerous amendments 
since original enactment in 1975, tribes across the country have 
entered into agreements with the federal government to assume 
responsibility for delivering federal programs, functions, services, 
and activities (PSFAs) to their members and local citizens.287 In fact, 
tribes that negotiate and enter into self-governance compacts are 
able to exercise the significant freedom to redesign the way 
previously federal PFSAs were carried out and reallocate federal 
funding as they see fit.288 These programs have been quite 
successful in shifting federal funding and control to tribes;289 
however, the ongoing expansion of these programs has slowed, and 
tribes still face limitations and challenges to the self-governance and 
self-determination scheme under the ISDEAA that echo the limits 
of Federal Indian energy policy. Therefore, broadening the trust 
relationship through reform of Federal Indian energy policy could 
                                                
286 Indian Self-Determination & Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 
88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 455–458e, 
458aa–458hh, 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012) transferred to 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301-32, 
5345-56, 5361-68, 5381-99); Indian Self-Determination & Education Assistance 
Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, repealed by 
Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 
711 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012) transferred to 25 
U.S.C. §§ 5381-99); Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 458aa–
hh (2012) transferred to 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361-68); Tribal Self-Governance 
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711(codified as 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 458aaa–458aaa-18 (2012) transferred to 25 U.S.C. §§ 5381–99). 
287 See generally Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 18–48.  
288 See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 34–45; 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361-68, 
5381-99. 
289 Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 48–49. 
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promote further reform of self-determination and self-governance 
programs as well. 
Thus, while the ISDEAA approach demonstrates the 
viability of individualized tribal-federal agreements in the energy 
realm, it is an imperfect model that also suffers from the history of 
the zero-sum federal-tribal dynamic. As recently described by two 
leading practitioners, the primary challenges posed by the current 
state of tribal self-governance programs are the lack of sufficient and 
sustained congressional funding, ongoing agency recalcitrance 
toward negotiating and entering such agreements, and the narrow 
scope of programs available for the assumption by tribes.290 Each of 
these is fundamentally similar to the zero-sum approach of Federal 
Indian energy policy as they all reflect the underlying assumption 
that tribes may only assume funds, functions, or duties that the 
federal government has deemed appropriate for tribal control and, 
even then, such control may only be exercised in accordance with 
federal standards. Agency and congressional failures to adequately 
request and fund the development and maintenance of tribal 
capacity necessary to carry out federal PFSAs has resulted in 
decades of litigation and ongoing funding challenges.291 Just as with 
TERAs and the HEARTH Act, therefore, tribes are often faced with 
the prospect of assuming PFSAs and their corresponding 
administrative burdens without a secure and committed funding 
source to address those additional costs adequately.292 A federal 
commitment to funding tribal capacity, whether for the oversight 
and regulation of energy development or the broader exercise of 
self-determination, could help alleviate these dire choices. 
Similarly, bureaucratic recalcitrance to engage in self-
governance compacting and to make a broader range of PFSAs 
available for such compacting demonstrates the “it’s us or them” 
mentality of the federal-tribal trade-off inherent in the zero-sum 
approach to Federal Indian energy policy.293 Rather than viewing 
                                                
290 Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 49. 
291 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005); Salazar v. Ramah 
Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182 (2012); Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249 at 
55–56. 
292 Cf. Washburn, supra note 22, at 219–220. 
293 An important caveat here, the nature of this recalcitrance is bureaucratic and 
stems primarily from the history of federal-tribal relations and its resulting 
statutory scheme rather than from the actions or mentality of individual federal 
employees who, with some exceptions, are committed to promoting tribal 
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tribes as partners with which to share and enhance the delivery of 
trust responsibilities, for example, many federal agencies have 
resisted the expansion of self-governance programs as inconsistent 
with the historic federal grantor-tribal grantee relationship, which 
allows for greater federal control and oversight of tribal activities.294 
This ongoing opposition has delayed much-needed amendments to 
the self-governance, and related employment training acts,295 and is 
consistent with the recent decision by the Department of the Interior 
to end its support for a unique approach to tribal management of the 
National Bison Range.296  
Thus, although the details and scope of Federal Indian 
energy policy may be quite different than other federal policies 
focused on tribal self-determination and self-governance, the 
challenges posed by the zero-sum approach to federal-tribal 
relations are endemic to both. The potential to detach Federal Indian 
energy policy from that approach by enhancing federal support for 
tribal capacity-building and broadening the bases on which the 
federal government can negotiate and develop its relationship with 
tribes may, therefore, present an opportunity for enhancing the 
federal-tribal relationship in these other contexts as well. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The current political climate has drastically raised the stakes 
and changed the potential for reform suggested herein. For example, 
President Trump’s directives to roll back various environmental and 
other regulations in the name of domestic fossil fuel production have 
magnified the political divide between environmental protection and 
energy development.297 Therefore, it seems likely that efforts to 
                                                
interests but may be unwilling constrained by bureaucratic, regulatory, or 
statutory limitations. 
294 See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 63–64.  
295 Strommer & Osborne, supra note 249, at 64–66; see also Indian 
Employment, Training, and Related Services Consolidation Act of 2017, S. 91, 
115th Cong. (as introduced, Jan. 10, 2017). 
296 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Comprehensive Conservation Management Plan 
for the National Bison Range, Moiese, Montana, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,843-02 (May 
18, 2017) (reversing prior direction of the Department of the Interior to pursue a 
legislative transfer of the National Bison Range to the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana).  
297 Promoting Energy Independence & Econ. Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783, 
82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (March 28, 2017); see also, e.g., Flatt and Payne, supra 
note 18, at 1103–04. See also Shannon M. Roesler, Beyond Zero-Sum 
Environmentalism, 47 ENVT’L. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,328 (2017). 
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reform Federal Indian energy policy aligning with the broader 
political interests of increasing development of fossil fuels will find 
traction while environmental concerns, along with tribal cultural, 
religious, and conservation issues, are likely to be ignored, if not 
targeted.298  
Concurrently, while trumpeting the significance of tribal 
sovereignty,299 the new administration has also proposed drastic 
budget reductions for the federal agencies most directly responsible 
for carrying out the trust responsibility to Indian Country.300 These 
proposals could be viewed as consistent with the perceived need for 
the federal government to get out of tribes’ way to promote energy 
and economic development.301 Indeed, Secretary Zinke even went 
so far as to suggest that tribes are seeking an “off-ramp” from the 
federal trust responsibility,302 a thinly-veiled throwback to the 
termination era of the 1950s.303 Thus, while reform of Federal Indian 
energy policy may find support at both ends of Pennsylvania 
Avenue and in the Department of the Interior, that support comes at 
a price and is tied to broader political ideologies separate from (and 
irrelevant to) the federal-tribal relationship, which may serve only 
to continue the narrow zero-sum approach of present-day Federal 
Indian energy policy, if not result in a return of de facto, if not de 
jure, termination.304  
                                                
298 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, 68 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Jan. 24, 2017), Review of Designations 
Under the Antiquities Act, Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 
26, 2017). 
299 See, e.g., Christine Powell, Zinke Touts Tribal Sovereignty as Key at 
Committee Hearing, LAW360 (March 8, 2017, 7:40 PM EST), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/899176/zinke-touts-tribal-sovereignty-as-key-
at-committee-hearing (last visited December 05, 2017).  
300 See, e.g., Office of MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AM. 
FIRST: A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AM. GREAT AGAIN 27 (2017), https: 
//www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_ 
blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLU6-U6CQ] (proposing a 12% cut in funding 
for the Department of the Interior). 
301 See, e.g., Sen. John Barrasso, Getting Wash. Out of Indian Cnty., INDIAN 
CNTY. TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Nov. 20, 2015, https: 
//indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/getting-washington-out-of-
indian-country/ [https://perma.cc/H3DN-YA7Q].  
302 Wolf, supra note 12. 
303 See Indigenous Law & Policy Center, Donald Trump, & Indian Cnty.’s 
Termination Fears, TURTLETALK (May 8, 2017), https://turtletalk.wordpress. 
com/2017/05/08/donald-trump-and-indian-countrys-termination-fears/ [https: 
//perma.cc/R3CG-RBEL] [hereinafter Trump Termination Fears].  
304 See supra notes 221-224; Washburn, supra note 22, at 220 (“If federal 
funding diminishes after tribes agree to take over federal functions, the federal 
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Therefore, if the future of Federal Indian energy policy is to 
truly serve the interests of all tribes, its reform must take a broader 
view than simply freeing tribes from federal oversight and 
correspondingly allowing the federal government to reduce its legal, 
moral, and fiscal commitments to Indian Country. Divorcing 
Federal Indian energy policy from its zero-sum past could open the 
doors to a broader re-conception of the federal-tribal relationship 
across other realms and allow tribes to truly decide for themselves 
how to engage with their federal trustee. Perhaps then the federal-
tribal relationship could move farther into the twenty-first 
century,305 instead of returning to its dismal past.306 
 
 
                                                
government will have off-loaded an important responsibility and left the scene, 
leaving tribes holding the (empty) bag.”). 
305 Cf. Gover, supra note 30. 
306 See Trump Termination Fears, supra note 303; Valerie Volcovici, Trump 
Advisors aim to Privatize Oil-Rich Indian Reservations, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2016, 
4:23 AM, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tribes-insight-
idUSKBN13U1B1 [https://perma.cc/7AU4-6FZ9] (noting the similarities 
between the move toward “privatization” and the earlier eras of allotment and 
termination).  
